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Developing a test of economic theories of bureaucracy through the use of an experimental approach.

机译:通过实验方法发展对官僚制经济理论的检验。

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摘要

Economic theories of bureaucracy do not lend themselves well to traditional methods of empirical analysis. In particular, evaluating the preferences of the bureaucrat is difficult when studying budget allocations. Yet preferences are important to these theories.;The purpose of this thesis is to develop and test a method revealing preferences and testing them against theories of bureaucracy. Applying game theory and theories of experimental economics, a 'Budget Game' is constructed and applied through a survey experiment. The results will provide data to test the theories. Subjects will be drawn from a public transportation agency. The results will determine the effectiveness of using this method in surveying other agencies.;The approach of the thesis is as follows: First, a model of a public agency is developed to discuss the various nonproductive expenditures and how preferences relate to expenditures. Next, three theories of bureaucracy from Economics, Sociology, and Political Science are discussed and analyzed from an economic perspective. In particular, these theories will clarify the preferences of bureaucrats, developing a common framework for comparison. Then principles of game theory are applied to developing the game form necessary to design and execute the experiment. This stage will establish the theoretical validity and allow an examination of the similarities and differences in the theories discussed. Finally, an experiment based on the 'Budget Game' will be developed and executed to test the model and the theories of bureaucracy.;The use of laboratory experiments in economics has grown considerably in recent years. Tests of supply and demand, public choice, and other aspects of economic theory have yielded insights into behavior and provided less 'noisy' data. It is hoped that among the outcomes of this research will be a better method of understanding the nature of bureaucracy and a contribution to an improved understanding of both the benefits and limitations of experimental analysis in economics.
机译:官僚主义的经济理论不能很好地适用于传统的经验分析方法。特别是在研究预算分配时,很难评估官僚的偏好。偏好对于这些理论很重要。本论文的目的是开发和测试一种揭示偏好的方法,并根据官僚主义理论对其进行检验。运用博弈论和实验经济学理论,通过调查实验构建并应用“预算博弈”。结果将提供数据以检验理论。主题将来自公共交通机构。结果将决定使用这种方法调查其他机构的有效性。本文的研究方法如下:首先,建立了一个公共机构模型来讨论各种非生产性支出以及偏好与支出之间的关系。接下来,从经济学的角度讨论和分析了三种官僚制理论,分别来自经济学,社会学和政治学。特别是,这些理论将阐明官僚的偏好,建立一个共同的比较框架。然后将博弈论的原理应用于开发设计和执行实验所需的博弈形式。这个阶段将确立理论有效性,并允许研究所讨论理论的异同。最后,将开发并执行一个基于“预算博弈”的实验来测试官僚主义的模型和理论。近年来,实验室实验在经济学中的使用已大大增加。对供需,公共选择以及经济理论其他方面的测试已经对行为产生了见解,并提供了较少的“嘈杂”数据。希望这项研究的结果将是更好的理解官僚主义性质的方法,并为增进对经济学中实验分析的利弊的理解做出贡献。

著录项

  • 作者

    Walker, James D.;

  • 作者单位

    City University of New York.;

  • 授予单位 City University of New York.;
  • 学科 Economics General.;Political Science Public Administration.;Transportation.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 1995
  • 页码 121 p.
  • 总页数 121
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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