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Rules versus discretion: A case for capital controls.

机译:规则与自由裁量权:资本管制的理由。

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This dissertation focuses on the credibility of a monetary authority that seeks to peg its nation's exchange rate. If the monetary authority's commitment to a policy rule is credible, then it maintains a fixed exchange rate. This dissertation attempts to study the effects of a target rate of currency depreciation, capital controls, and the timing of monetary policy actions on the credibility of the monetary authority.; A standard small open economy rational expectations model is used to study the credibility of the monetary authority's commitment. The monetary authority's credibility is evaluated in a framework similar to the one developed by Barro-Gordon (1983).; The absence of a target depreciation rate reduces the monetary authority's credibility. In the presence of capital controls, the target depreciation rate does not impact on the credibility of the monetary authority. The use of capital controls can be justified if the monetary authority is concerned about stabilizing the economy and imported inflation. The capital controls insulate the economy from the effects of demand shock and imported inflation. The erosion of capital controls with time induces variability in output growth and inflation rate.; If the monetary authority does not stabilize the economy and there is no imported inflation, then the monetary authority's commitment is credible. The presence of a target depreciation rate further improves the monetary authority's credibility.; In the special case where the monetary authority does not stabilize the economy and capital controls are present, the absence of imported inflation makes the monetary authority's commitment credible.; Overall, the monetary authority's credibility improves when the economy is stable and distortions in the economy are high. The presence of a target rate of depreciation enhances the credibility of the monetary authority's commitment. Capital controls do not have any effect on the monetary authority's credibility. Capital controls are able to protect the output growth from demand shocks. Hence, demand shocks may be one of the reasons to use capital controls. The use of capital controls should be restricted to short periods of time because with time the controls tend to become ineffective and increase the variability of output growth.
机译:本文着眼于试图钉住本国汇率的货币当局的信誉。如果货币当局对政策规则的承诺是可信的,则它将维持固定汇率。本文试图研究目标货币贬值率,资本控制以及货币政策行动时间对货币当局信誉的影响。标准的小型开放经济理性预期模型用于研究货币当局承诺的可信度。货币当局的信誉是在类似于Barro-Gordon(1983)开发的框架中评估的。没有目标折旧率会降低货币当局的信誉。在存在资本管制的情况下,目标折旧率不会影响货币当局的信誉。如果货币当局关注稳定经济和进口通货膨胀,那么使用资本管制是合理的。资本管制使经济免受需求冲击和进口通货膨胀的影响。资本管制随着时间的流逝导致产出增长和通货膨胀率的变化。如果货币当局不能稳定经济并且没有进口通货膨胀,那么货币当局的承诺是可信的。目标折旧率的存在进一步提高了货币当局的信誉。在特殊情况下,如果货币当局无法稳定经济并且存在资本管制,则由于没有进口通货膨胀,货币当局的承诺是可信的。总体而言,当经济稳定且经济扭曲程度很高时,货币当局的信誉就会提高。目标折旧率的存在增强了货币当局承诺的可信度。资本管制对货币当局的信誉没有任何影响。资本管制能够保护产出增长免受需求冲击。因此,需求冲击可能是使用资本管制的原因之一。资本管制的使用应限制在短时间内,因为随着时间的流逝,管制往往变得无效,并增加了产出增长的可变性。

著录项

  • 作者单位

    The University of Alabama.;

  • 授予单位 The University of Alabama.;
  • 学科 Economics Theory.; Economics Commerce-Business.; Economics General.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 1997
  • 页码 140 p.
  • 总页数 140
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 经济学;贸易经济;经济学;
  • 关键词

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