Language, logic, knowledge, and reality: The logical atomisms of Russell and Wittgenstein.

摘要

It is widely believed that both Bertrand Russell and the early Ludwig Wittgenstein were logical atomists, although what is meant by that term has always been somewhat elusive. This dissertation examines their respective philosophies in light of their overall shared commitment to pursuing philosophy in a distinctively modern and analysis-driven way, i.e., in light of their agreement that philosophy is essentially the activity of pursuing the logical clarification of language (and doing so in a way not unlike the activity of science in important respects). In addition to providing a systematic exposition and elucidation of their respective philosophies, I argue that Wittgenstein shared with Russell neither his commitment to the truth of phenomenalism nor his realism with regards to universals. On the contrary, I argue that Wittgenstein was a metaphysical nominalist. Nevertheless, I believe it remains true to say that both Russell and Wittgenstein defended what can correctly be characterized as philosophies of logical atomism.; In the process of defending these claims, I examine and criticize the recent interpretations of Wittgenstein's philosophy offered in Wittgenstein's Metaphysics by John Cook and in Investigating Wittgenstein by Merrill and Jaakko Hintikka. I also defend what can be defended in David Pears' modern classic of Wittgenstein scholarship, The False Prison and Peter Carruthers' The Metaphysics of the Tractatus. Although the interpretation of Wittgenstein's early philosophy which I offer is, I believe, the correct one, I also discuss an important objection to the view that the simples of the Tractatus are not sense-data; namely, that it renders the relationship which must obtain between a language and the world utterly mysterious.; The dissertation concludes with a chapter on logical atomism in retrospect in which it is argued that, although much of the philosophy of logical atomism is dead, there are elements of both Wittgenstein's metaphysics and Russell's epistemology which deserve a second look. It is argued in particular that if the world is, as Wittgenstein says, "all that is the case," then the logical atomists were correct in believing that the substance of the world must consist ultimately of simple objects standing in immediate combination. I believe that this insight constitutes a lasting contribution to metaphysics.