Vice and virtue, extremism and moderation: The rise of modern conservatism, 1957-1972 (Ronald Reagan, Barry Goldwater).

摘要

How did American conservatism, little more than a collection of loosely related beliefs in the late 1940s and early 1950s, become a coherent political and social force in the 1960s? Conventional accounts explain the resurgence of conservatism as a reaction to the alleged excesses and failures of liberalism in the 1960s. In contrast, this dissertation argues that between 1957 and 1972, conservatives initiated their own revolution. Dissatisfied with what they perceived as a liberal Republican Party, conservatives built a movement from the ground up, intent on capturing the G.O.P. and shaping it into a body to reform America.; Using a wide range of archival sources, including the papers of Barry Goldwater, Ronald Reagan, and William F. Buckley, this dissertation traces how ideology inspired action, and how action was translated into political power. In the first decade after World War II, intellectuals outlined three strands of conservatism--traditionalism, libertarianism, and anticommunism-- which found a receptive audience among a self-selected population. In the second half of the decade, events helped catalyze the conservative enterprise in America, even while exposing disunity in the conservative camp. Activists spawned several independent factions. Those organizations, acting much like third parties, forced the G.O.P. and even the Democrats to respond to their agendas.; Various grassroots constituencies emerged. They backed local and national candidates, created new circles in which to socialize, and developed a "movement culture" necessary to sustain the political apparatus. Though Barry Goldwater suffered a devastating defeat in 1964, it did not take long for conservatives to regroup. William F. Buckley, Jr.'s candidacy for the Mayoralty of New York City, and Ronald Reagan's 1966 gubernatorial campaign in California helped turn the tide for electoral conservatism in the post-Goldwater era.; Liberal failures alone did not ensure conservative success; conservatives themselves did, and only after many failures of their own. To everyone's surprise but their own, by the 1970s conservatives had helped reconfigure the political and social landscape. By examining this evident but poorly understood legacy of the 1960s, this study seeks to begin constructing a comprehensive portrait of the era.