Neoliberalism and democracy: The state and popular participation in post-authoritarian Chile.

摘要

This dissertation assesses the Chilean popular sectors' ability to promote their interests within the political arena of Chile's new democracy. The broader theoretical objective behind this work is to understand how market-oriented reforms implemented in Latin America's new democracies affect state-society relations in general and the prospects for democratic inclusiveness in particular. Towards this end, this research identifies how the state structures the propensity and capacity for collective action among the popular sectors in the context of an export oriented development model. It does so, in part, by demonstrating how liberal welfare regimes such as Chile's, through stratified assignment and delivery of social welfare resources, may undermine the popular sectors' capacity for concerted political action.;Similarly, this study suggests how state and economic reform structured in accordance with market principles affects linkages between political parties and their popular sector constituents. It argues that with drastically reduced resources at their disposal and with concerns about market stability preeminent, political parties will refrain from the common practice under ISI of organizing and inciting grassroots constituents to place ever increasing demands upon the state. In an open market, producers cannot pass along the cost of increased wages and benefits to consumers without suffering a loss in competitiveness.;Moreover, the public's ability to demand increasing social welfare resources from the state may ignite inflationary pressures and make private investors reluctant to invest. This study demonstrates that given such considerations, politicians and state managers will attempt to keep political participation, and the social demands it generates, at a minimum.;Finally, this study contributes to our understanding of how state decentralization can impede the development of local democracy. When the transfer to local governments for the administrative responsibility of services traditionally controlled by the central government is not accompanied by a commensurate devolution in policy-making authority or control over resources for local leaders, decentralization magnifies the poorest communities' spatial segregation and fiscal dependence. In turn, such spatial segregation and fiscal dependence enhances the central government's ability to control local populations rather than heightening the ability of these populations to make local politicians responsive to their concerns.