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On the role of uncertainty and asymmetric asset liquidity on large and small banks and small business lending: Models and evidence.

机译:关于不确定性和资产流动性不对称在大小银行和小企业贷款中的作用:模型和证据。

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This thesis develops a two period model of a bank in which size of bank, and portfolio decisions matter to the ability and willingness of banks to make small business loans. We distinguish between large and small banks. All banks face both default risk and liquidity risk in their lending and deposit holding decisions. All banks must make illiquid lending decisions prior to knowing what their draw of the state of the world is. Large banks may make small business loans, loans to large businesses, mortgage loans, and may hold deposits, and buy and sell funds on the inter-bank market. Small banks may not make loans to large businesses. Unlike other work on bank behavior, both risks are conceptualized as arising endogenously as a result of portfolio decisions managers make.; The model sets up two "Cases". In the first, all loans except mortgage loans are illiquid. In this "Case" bank managers face one of two "Situations". In the first, managers face a given probability of facing either default risk or liquidity risk singly. In the second, they face the probability of facing both risks simultaneously, or neither risk. Uncertainty regarding future interest rates on loans and deposits coupled with uncertainty over risks leads managers to choose certain portfolios. If they guess wrong, then they face costs of this mistake. Managers may choose to hold more of fewer liquid deposits or illiquid loans, depending on what they expect. We model the optimal level of small business lending.; In the second "Case" Commercial and Industrial loans to large businesses are securitizable, and hence salable. Small business loans remain illiquid. Facing the same "Situations", but now with more options, we model the optimal level of small business lending by large and small banks. Small banks cannot originate securitized loans, but can purchase them to increase the diversity and/or liquidity of their balance sheets.; The model is tested econometrically, and is shown to work banks, but not for small.
机译:本文建立了一个两阶段的银行模型,在该模型中,银行的规模和投资组合决策与银行进行小企业贷款的能力和意愿有关。我们区分大型和小型银行。所有银行在其贷款和存款持有决策中都面临违约风险和流动性风险。所有银行都必须做出流动性低下的贷款决策,然后才能知道他们对世界状况的看法。大型银行可能会提供小型企业贷款,大型企业贷款,抵押贷款,并可能持有存款,并在银行间市场上买卖资金。小银行可能不向大企业贷款。与其他有关银行行为的工作不同,这两种风险都被概念化为是由于经理做出投资组合决策而内生的。该模型设置了两个“案例”。首先,除抵押贷款外,所有贷款都是非流动性的。在此“案例”中,银行经理面临两个“情况”之一。首先,经理们面临着既面临违约风险又面临流动性风险的既定概率。在第二种情况下,他们面临同时面对两种风险或两种风险都不存在的可能性。由于未来贷款和存款利率的不确定性以及风险的不确定性,导致经理选择了某些投资组合。如果他们猜错了,那么他们将为此付出代价。经理们可以根据自己的期望,选择持有更少的流动性存款或非流动性贷款。我们为小企业贷款的最佳水平建模。在第二个“案例”中,对大型企业的工商业贷款是可以证券化的,因此可以出售。小企业贷款仍然缺乏流动性。面对相同的“情况”,但现在有了更多选择,我们为大型和小型银行的小型企业贷款的最佳水平建模。小银行不能发放证券化贷款,但可以购买它们以增加资产负债表的多样性和/或流动性。该模型经过计量经济学测试,并显示为有效,但规模不大。

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