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A Unified Model of How Jurors Update and Re-Evaluate Evidence to Reach a Verdict.

机译:陪审员如何更新和重新评估证据以得出判决的统一模型。

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摘要

Prominent researchers have suggested that criminal prosecutions should require more than the testimony of a single eyewitness. The present study investigated the effects of how additional evidence, beyond a single eyewitness, affected mock jury decision making. The results are compared to predictions from Bayes Theorem, which provides a normative/rational/statistical model of how mock jurors should update judgments given new information. Participants (N = 440, data collected via MTurk) read a summary of testimony from the victim of a home invasion, and then at Time 1 (T1), they judged the Likelihood of the defendant's Guilt, rated their Trust in the Victim's testimony, and rendered a Verdict. At Time 2 (T2), participants read one of six additional types of evidence: strong or weak forensic, strong or weak eyewitness, or strong or weak confession evidence, and answered the same questions as at Time 1. All participants were then instructed to disregard the additional T2 evidence, and at Time 3 (T3), they answered the questions for a third time. Three independent evaluations of each piece of additional evidence supported a "true" value of that information for Bayesian predictions. However using these values, Bayesian predictions for Likelihood of Guilt at T2 and T3 always over-adjusted the change in Likelihood of Guilt. At T2, Bayes over-predicted guilt, whereas at T3, Bayes underpredicted guilt. Contrary to Bayes Theorem, the value of prior information, such as the eyewitness's testimony, changed as new evidence was added or removed. All participants other than the weak forensic group increased in Likelihood, Trust, and Verdict at Time 2, and declined at Time 3 to levels similar to Time 1. The weak forensic evidence group declined on all measures at Time 2, which replicated Martire et al. (2013), but surprisingly they rebounded on Trust and Verdict at Time 3 to levels significantly higher than at Time 1. In conclusion, Bayes theorem does not describe how mock jurors use more than one piece of evidence in making decisions. The value of any piece of evidence depends in part on the value of other evidence. Multiple regression predicted mock juror decision-making better than Bayes theorem.
机译:杰出的研究人员建议,刑事起诉所需要的不仅仅是单身证人的证词。本研究调查了单证人以外的其他证据如何影响模拟陪审团的决策。将结果与贝叶斯定理的预测进行比较,贝叶斯定理提供了一个模拟/陪审员应如何根据给定的新信息更新判断的规范/理性/统计模型。参与者(N = 440,通过MTurk收集的数据)阅读了一次房屋入侵受害者的证词摘要,然后在时间1(T1),他们判断被告的内the可能性,在受害者的证词中对信任度进行了评级,并作出判决在时间2(T2),参与者阅读了六种其他类型的证据中的一种:强或弱的法证,强或弱的目击证人,或强或弱的供词证据,并回答了与时间1相同的问题。忽略了额外的T2证据,并且在时间3(T3),他们第三次回答了问题。每个附加证据的三个独立评估支持该信息对于贝叶斯预测的“真实”价值。但是,使用这些值,贝叶斯对T2和T3的内of感可能性的预测总是过度调整了内Gui感的可能性。在T2,贝叶斯高估了内感,而在T3,贝叶斯低估了内感。与贝叶斯定理相反,先验信息的价值(例如目击者的证词)随着新证据的添加或删除而改变。除弱法证组外,所有参与者在时间2的可能性,信任度和判决均增加,在时间3下降至与时间1相似的水平。法医学证据弱的群体在时间2的所有衡量指标均下降,这与Martire等类似。 (2013年),但令人惊讶的是,他们在时间3的“信任和判决”上反弹至明显高于时间1的水平。总之,贝叶斯定理没有描述模拟陪审员如何在决策中使用多个证据。任何证据的价值部分取决于其他证据的价值。多元回归比贝叶斯定理更好地预测了模拟陪审员的决策。

著录项

  • 作者

    Murphy, Ryan P.;

  • 作者单位

    The Catholic University of America.;

  • 授予单位 The Catholic University of America.;
  • 学科 Psychology.;Experimental psychology.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2016
  • 页码 173 p.
  • 总页数 173
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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