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Valuation of presale launches in market equilibrium: Real options strategic exercise.

机译:在市场均衡中进行预售估值:实物期权策略。

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摘要

Presale of residential units refers to putting the units on sale before they are completed. The value of presale to the developer comes from the flexibility of timing the presale launch so as to optimize the expected payoff. We model the developer's optimal launch timing as a real option, and the purchaser's series of presale payments with the flexibility to default as compound options. By assuming a stochastic property price process, we derive model frameworks that a risk-averse developer should adopt in launching the presale under single and multiple payment schemes. The frameworks solve the optimal conditions, contract structures, and prices for the launch. We then extend the model to optimize developers' payoffs in monopolistic and imperfect market equilibria. Finally, by assuming a jump-diffusion demand shock process and based on game theoretic approach, we derive sub-game Nash equilibrium optimal strategies that determine when and at what price developers should launch for presale with stochastic or deterministic rare market events. All the models thus derived are subject to probabilities of purchaser defaults, which will happen if the contract prices are too high when compared to market prices. Our model frameworks confirm that the launch option values increase with increases in price growth rates and variances, but decrease in risk-free rates. Furthermore, developers tend to delay the launch when good events are anticipated, while launching presale earlier at lower prices in times of expected bad events. The equilibrium strategies also provide an alternative explanation to oversupply in property markets. We further illustrate effects of rare events on presale launching strategies through government intervention (particularly public housing and housing subsidies) and output flow uncertainty in competitive equilibrium. Our general optimal strategic models are robust in a few aspects. First, we include the time factor that is crucial for some real options. Second, only slight adjustments are required to cope with market changes, or jumps. Finally, the strategies thus derived can be extensively and flexibly applied to other real options which incur multi-stage contingent payoffs, and whose price processes are characterized by stochastic jump-diffusion process.
机译:住宅单元的预售是指在单元建成之前将其出售。对开发商而言,预售的价值来自对预售启动进行计时的灵活性,以优化预期收益。我们将开发人员的最佳启动时间建模为实物期权,并将购买者的一系列预付款建模,并可以灵活地默认为复合期权。通过假设随机的房地产价格过程,我们推导了模型模型,这些规避风险的开发商在采用单付款和多付款方案进行预售时应采用该模型框架。这些框架解决了发射的最佳条件,合同结构和价格。然后,我们扩展模型以在垄断和不完善的市场均衡中优化开发商的收益。最后,通过假设跳扩散需求冲击过程并基于博弈论方法,我们得出了子博弈纳什均衡最优策略,该策略确定了开发商应在何时以及以什么价格发起具有随机或确定性稀有市场事件的预售。由此得出的所有模型都受买方违约概率的影响,如果合同价格与市场价格相比过高,就会发生违约。我们的模型框架证实,启动期权的价值会随着价格增长率和差异的增加而增加,但无风险利率会降低。此外,开发人员倾向于在预期到好事件发生时推迟发布,而在预期的坏事件发生时以较低的价格提前进行预售。均衡策略还为房地产市场的供过于求提供了另一种解释。通过政府干预(尤其是公共住房和住房补贴)以及竞争均衡中的输出流量不确定性,我们进一步说明了稀有事件对预售推出策略的影响。我们的一般最佳战略模型在几个方面都很稳健。首先,我们包括对某些实际选择至关重要的时间因素。其次,仅需进行少量调整即可应对市场变化或跳跃。最后,由此得出的策略可以广泛地,灵活地应用于产生多阶段或有回报的其他实物期权,并且其价格过程的特征在于随机跳跃扩散过程。

著录项

  • 作者

    Lai, Neng Rose.;

  • 作者单位

    Chinese University of Hong Kong (People's Republic of China).;

  • 授予单位 Chinese University of Hong Kong (People's Republic of China).;
  • 学科 Economics Finance.; Urban and Regional Planning.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2001
  • 页码 192 p.
  • 总页数 192
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 财政、金融;区域规划、城乡规划;
  • 关键词

  • 入库时间 2022-08-17 11:47:21

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