China's economic leverage and Taiwan's security concerns with respect to cross-Strait economic relations.

摘要

Taiwan's government feels ill at ease having a close economic relationship with its powerful political rival China. Taipei's primary concern is that Beijing will exploit its economic leverage by imposing economic sanctions to achieve political goals if asymmetric interdependence emerges between Taiwan and China.; This research intends to answer two categories of questions: First, how large is China's economic leverage over Taiwan through economic sanctions and what factors would contribute to China's decision to exploit this economic leverage? And, second, how vulnerable is Taiwan to China's exploitation of economic leverage through imposing economic sanctions and what factors would contribute to the success or failure of these sanctions?; In two steps, this study analyzes the above two questions. First, it explores the implications of prior research on the initiation and outcome of economic sanctions. Second, this study examines two case studies, the 1995–96 and 1999–2000 Taiwan Strait tensions. This study explores why China exercised such great restraint in not imposing economic sanctions against Taiwan in these incidents. Furthermore, this study explores implications for how vulnerable Taiwan is to China's economic sanctions by analyzing how vulnerable Taiwan was to military threats in these incidents.; Regarding theories on the initiation of sanctions, the necessary condition for China to impose sanctions against Taiwan is that its costs be lower than Taiwan's. Second, China might use economic leverage to signal its resolve. Third, the dynamic balance among the public and global/domestic interest groups, and the conditions of political and economic stability will, in the end, determine whether China will impose sanctions against Taiwan.; In case studies, Beijing did not impose sanctions against Taiwan in either 1995–96 or 1999–2000 for the following reasons: (1) Relative costs of sanctions for Beijing were higher than for Taipei; (2) Beijing had considerable concerns about domestic economic development and social stability; (3) Beijing faced significant pressure from domestic interest groups. Beijing is even more unlikely to impose economic sanctions against Taiwan in the future because of global commodity chains involving both Taiwan and China, China's increasingly greater integration into the global economy, and China's increasingly open society and politics which allows for more input from interest groups and the public.; Regarding theories on the outcome of sanctions, the probability for success of China's sanctions is only 4.6 to 10.4 percent. Given severe hostility between Taiwan and China, the necessary condition for China's successful sanctions resulting in Taiwan's moderate concessions is that China enjoys a large gap of costs in its favor. The other most important factors influencing the effectiveness of sanctions are as follows: rally-around-the-flag effects, fifth-column effects, and perception of decision-makers in Taiwan. There is little evidence that China's sanctions against Taiwan would be successful while much evidence shows that China's sanctions would fail in the future.; Overall, in terms of both initiation and outcome of economic sanctions, China has no economic leverage over Taiwan and Taiwan's vulnerability with respect to cross-Strait economic relations is almost nonexistent.