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Money creation in a random-matching model of money.

机译:货币随机匹配模型中的货币创造。

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摘要

Essay 1. “Another Example in which Lump-Sum Money Creation is Beneficial.” (Joint with Neil Wallace.) We assume a two-unit upper bound on money holdings and adopt ex post individual rationality as the notion of implementability. The policy is a probabilistic version of the standard helicopter drops followed by proportional reduction in individual holdings. For all discount factors greater than a critical value, we show analytically that the ex ante optimum involves creation of money. This is done by finding the best outcome subject to no money creation and by showing that some creation can improve that outcome. Our results for a two-unit bound on holdings are indicative for what can happen with all higher bounds.; Essay 2. “Optimal Money Creation in a Random-Matching Model with Expost Individual Rationality.” Although Essay 1 accomplishes the goal of showing that money creation can be helpful, it does not describe the optima. I study the same model (while letting the bound on money holdings be arbitrary) where I do two things. First, I show that, under a mild restriction on the set of implementable outcomes, conditional on the amount of money transferred in a meeting there is no randomization over output, a property I call degeneracy. This degeneracy result facilitates the exploration of the trade-off between harmful and beneficial effects of money creation by way of examples. I compute optimal allocations for examples with a two-unit bound on holdings. These examples are consistent with conjecture that, in the region where money creation is beneficial, the optima do not have take-it-or-leave-it offers by consumers in all meetings—the bargaining rule imposed by Molico.; Essay 3. “Money Creation and Optimal Pairwise Core Allocations in a Matching Model.” Here I adopt the ex ante pairwise core notion of implementability. In contrast to what happens using the ex post IR notion, now the optimum, even with no money creation, involves binding participation constraints. Therefore, the proof technique of Essay 1 is not applicable. Moreover, it is difficult to get any analytical results. Therefore, I compute numerical examples. I find that in all examples there are no benefits of money creation. This is important because it leaves open whether money creation is beneficial if the bound on holdings is large. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)
机译:论文1:“另一个例子,一次性创造金钱是有益的。” (与尼尔·华莱士(Neil Wallace)联合。)我们假设货币持有量有两个单位的上限,并采用事后个人理性作为可实施性的概念。该政策是标准直升机降落的概率版本,然后是个人持股量成比例减少。对于所有大于临界值的折现因子,我们通过分析表明,事前最优涉及创造货币。这是通过在没有金钱创造的情况下找到最佳结果并通过证明某些创造可以改善该结果来实现的。我们对持有量为两个单位的结果表明,在所有更高的范围内都会发生什么。论文2:“具有暴露个人理性的随机匹配模型中的最优货币创造。”尽管论文1达到了表明赚钱会有所帮助的目的,但它并未描述最优方法。我研究了相同的模型(同时让货币持有量的边界为任意值),其中我做两件事。首先,我表明,在对可实现的结果集进行适度限制的情况下,以会议中转移的资金为条件,输出不会随机化,我称之为退化。这种简并性结果有助于通过示例的方式探索货币创造的有害和有益影响之间的折衷。我为持有量为两个单位的示例计算最佳分配。这些例子与推测相吻合,即在一个有利于创造货币的地区,最优价格并没有在所有会议上都被消费者接受或放弃,这是莫利科制定的议价规则。论文3:“匹配模型中的货币创造和最佳成对核心分配。”在这里,我采用了可实施性的事前成对核心概念。与使用事后投资者关系概念所发生的情况相反,即使没有创造任何金钱,现在的最优方案也具有约束力。因此,论文1的证明技术不适用。而且,很难获得任何分析结果。因此,我计算了数值示例。我发现在所有示例中,赚钱都没有好处。这一点很重要,因为如果持仓量很大,那么创造货币是否有益还没有定论。 (摘要由UMI缩短。)

著录项

  • 作者

    Deviatov, Alexei Y.;

  • 作者单位

    The Pennsylvania State University.;

  • 授予单位 The Pennsylvania State University.;
  • 学科 Economics Theory.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2002
  • 页码 53 p.
  • 总页数 53
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 经济学;
  • 关键词

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