Essays on cooperative perspectives of patent licensing games.

摘要

The representation problem of strategic-form game in coalitional form, i.e. how to derive a v-function that represents the worth of each coalition of players, is revisited, studied and applied to patent licensing problems. We propose a new way of deriving a v-function from strategic-form games, which 1.4 based on the strategy profile that satisfies the best response property under a coalition structure with subcoalitions.; We study in Chapter 2 the asymptotic properties of the Shapley value of patent licensing games in the Cournot competition. The Shapley value of the outside patentee of a non-drastic cost-reducing innovation converges to ε( a–c), which coincides with the patentee's profit in a large industry with non-cooperative licensing by means of fixed fees in Kamien and Tauman (1986). The asymptotic Shapley value is excluded from the limit bargaining set and the distance from the asymptotic nucleolus becomes larger as the magnitude ε of the cost reduction increases. The core is empty.; We formalize in Chapter 3 a cooperative licensing game in the Bertrand triopoly with differentiated commodities, where an outside patentee licenses to firms its cost-reducing innovation, considering coalition structures with distribution rules that are formed endogenously in the process of writing agreement. The main result is that it is most profitable for the patentee to license its new technology to two firms.; The v-function derived in our new way is well-defined if every player's strategy space is nonempty, compact, convex, and the payoff function is continuous and quasi-concave. In Appendix A, the quasi-concavity requirement is relaxed so that the new derivation can be applied to any games in strategic form with the Nash equilibrium. The generalization is given in games without side payments. Some suggestion on the number of the NTU values is also given with an example.