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Bumbling, Bluffing, and Bald-Faced Lies: Mis-Leading and Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations.

机译:um不休,虚张声势和秃顶的谎言:国际关系中的过失领导和国内观众成本。

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摘要

In a democratic society, does the electorate approve of truth and disapprove of deception, do opinion patterns exclusively mimic partisan elite views, or do opinion patterns react exclusively to successful or failed outcomes? Do citizens hold leaders accountable for the perceived truthfulness of foreign policy claims or do they only evaluate whether or not the policies were successful? The existing literature on public opinion and foreign policy calls the accountability role for the public "audience costs," and specifies that concerns about audience costs constrain leaders. However, the literature is not clear on what role normative issues may play in generating audience costs. This gap in the literature is notable because so much of the debate surrounding significant policy issues, especially war-making and military action, is couched in retrospective, normative, moralizing language. These debates make no sense if the pragmatic, forward-looking dimensions of audience costs---reliability and success---are all that exist. Through a survey experiment and four historical case studies developed with primary and secondary historical sources, news articles, and polling data, I find that there is a complex dynamic at work between the public's desire for successful outcomes and the high value placed upon truth-telling and transparency within a democracy. Studying justifications for military action and war, I find that the public will be motivated to punish leaders perceived as deceptive, but that imposition of audience costs will be moderated by factors including partisanship, degree of elite unity, and the leader's damage control strategy in response to disapproval.
机译:在民主社会中,选民是否赞成真理,不赞成欺骗?意见模式是否仅模仿党派精英观点,或者意见模式仅对成功或失败的结果做出反应?公民是让领导人对人们认为外交政策主张的真实性负责吗,还是只评估政策是否成功?现有的有关舆论和外交政策的文献称公众的“听众成本”为问责制角色,并指出对观众成本的关注限制了领导者。但是,关于规范性问题在产生受众成本方面可能起什么作用的文献尚不清楚。文献中的这种差距是值得注意的,因为围绕重大政策问题(尤其是战争和军事行动)的大量辩论都采用回顾性,规范性和道德化的语言。如果存在所有实用的,前瞻性的受众成本维度-可靠性和成功-则这些辩论毫无意义。通过调查实验和四个历史案例研究,这些历史案例研究使用主要和次要历史资源,新闻报道和民意测验数据进行开发,我发现在公众对成功成果的渴望与讲真话的高价值之间,存在着一种复杂的动力。民主内部的透明度和透明度。通过研究军事行动和战争的理由,我发现公众将受到激励来惩罚被认为具有欺骗性的领导者,但是听众成本的提高将受到党派关系,精英团结程度以及领导者的伤害控制策略等因素的控制。不赞成。

著录项

  • 作者

    Diaz, Amber Adela.;

  • 作者单位

    Duke University.;

  • 授予单位 Duke University.;
  • 学科 Ethics.;Political Science General.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2011
  • 页码 422 p.
  • 总页数 422
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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