Al-Farabi's interpretation of Aristotle's theory of intellect.

摘要

My dissertation is focused on Abu Nasr al-Farabi's treatment of Aristotle's De Anima 111.5, wherein we find Aristotle's most important (and most allusive) remarks on the intellect and the acquisition of knowledge. Contrary to the attitude of those within his own tradition, al-Farabi is not currently recognized as an illuminator of Aristotle's thoughts on the intellect. My dissertation corrects this. I show that al-Farabi's treatment of De Anima 111.5 offers a new look at Aristotle's epistemology that informs various issues that have interested and baffled readers of Aristotle throughout the centuries.;The focal point of De Anima 111.5 is an aspect of intellect that, according to Aristotle, "makes all things." Commentators refer to this aspect of the intellect as the nous poietikos , variously translated as "Active Intellect" or "Productive Intellect." Given the absence of any kind of demiurgic agent within Aristotle's philosophy, commentators generally agree that the Active Intellect plays a central role in actualization of the human intellect. Or, in other words, it in some fashion "makes" the human being know and the forms of all things known. The principal point of disagreement in this regard involves the Active Intellect's, so to speak, "place" within a properly Aristotelian cosmology and metaphysics. For some, it is identified with the thinking of the Prime Mover. According to others, it is identified with the human intellect itself.;While commentators generally defend one of the two interpretations above, al-Farabi offers a mediating view that sees the Active Intellect as an intermediary between God and Man. It is God-like in terms of its perpetual activity and pervades the human intellect in the course of scientific investigation. It enables the scientist to discover universal forms in matter and acts as a kind of repository of truths that humans have collectively learned about things in the world. I show in my dissertation that al-Farabi's interpretation of Aristotle is plausible and serves to rectify various epistemological problems that arise when one claims either one of the two more common interpretive poles at the exclusion of the other.