Toward a particularist autonomy.

摘要

My dissertation investigates the possibility of a particularist account of moral autonomy. I offer a two-part argument regarding autonomy: first, I argue that autonomy is a necessary condition for one's actions to have moral worth. The second part of my argument holds that, appearances notwithstanding, particularist ethical views have the resources to offer an account of autonomous moral agency. The first two chapters deal with the first part of the argument; the second two with the latter part. In the first chapter I explain why each of the particularist features, by emphasizing receptivity rather than, for example, reflection and deliberation, appears opposed to the kind of independence necessary for autonomy.;In the second chapter I criticize Nomy Arpaly's recent attempts to offer an account of moral worth and agency that embraces this receptivity and offers little or no role to deliberation and self-control. I argue that Arpaly's view doesn't offer a way to avoid the conflict between autonomy and the receptivity of particularism.;In Chapter Three consider Christine Korsgaard's recent arguments in defense of the necessity of principles for self-determination. The focus there is on Korsgaard's claim that we can't genuinely act unless we adopt a moral principle to govern that act. I argue that this claim is plausible when the alternative is the pure discernment view, but not when the alternative is the form of particularism dubbed the defeasible generalization view.;In the final chapter I examine the question of whether we need principles for moral guidance. I argue, against the views of Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge, that moral principles aren't necessary for us to have sufficient autonomy over our beliefs. That is, we don't need moral principles for guidance concerning what to believe. We can, without moral principles, develop beliefs which count as self-determined.