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Nonlinear pricing in oligopoly: Theory and empirical evidence.

机译:寡头垄断中的非线性定价:理论和经验证据。

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摘要

This dissertation is about second-degree price discrimination in oligopoly. The first two chapters are theoretical investigations of a specific intertemporal duopoly pricing problem. The third chapter is empirical, it investigates the classic nonlinear pricing problem under oligopoly.;The first two chapters have a lot in common. They both consider a two-stage game between two firms that are facing consumers with time-varying preferences. The problem of the firms is to determine the optimal contracts, given the nature of consumer preferences. In the first model, consumption occurs only once, while in the second, it occurs in both stages. The first model could be interpreted as one about advance (ex-ante) and spot (ex-post) pricing. The second model could be viewed as one about long-term (ex-ante) and short-term (ex-post) contracts. The main conclusions are nevertheless, the same. The nature of the equilibrium depends on the magnitude of the uncertainty in consumers' tastes. For small levels of uncertainty, the equilibrium involves only spot prices (Model 1) or short-term contracts (Model 2). For large levels of uncertainty, the equilibrium involves only advance prices (Model 1) or long-term contracts (Model 2) For medium levels of uncertainty, the equilibrium involves both kind of prices (Model 1) or both kinds of contracts (Model 2). Therefore, the existence of advance markets or long-term contracts does not matter when the uncertainty is small, but it has important welfare consequences when the uncertainty is large.;In the third chapter, I develop a structural oligopoly model with nonlinear pricing. I estimate the model using data from the US wireless phone service industry. The structural parameter estimates are used to forecast the effects of policy alternatives. I measure the welfare consequences of nonlinear pricing by comparing the actual outcome to a regime where firms are required to post two-part tariffs. The conclusion is that, similarly to the classic monopoly models, nonlinear pricing helps firms to extract more profits, while it hurts consumers.
机译:本文是关于寡头垄断中二级价格歧视的研究。前两章是对特定跨期双头定价问题的理论研究。第三章是实证研究,探讨了寡头垄断下的经典非线性定价问题。前两章有很多共同之处。他们都认为面对面临时变偏好的消费者的两家公司之间的两阶段博弈。考虑到消费者偏好的性质,企业的问题是确定最佳合同。在第一个模型中,消耗仅发生一次,而在第二个模型中,消耗在两个阶段中都发生。第一个模型可以解释为关于提前定价(事前定价)和现货定价(事后定价)的模型。第二种模式可以看作是关于长期(事前)合同和短期(事后)合同的模型。然而,主要结论是相同的。均衡的性质取决于消费者口味不确定性的大小。对于较小程度的不确定性,均衡仅涉及现货价格(模型1)或短期合约(模型2)。对于较大的不确定性水平,均衡只涉及预售价格(模型1)或长期合同(模型2)。对于中等水平的不确定性水平,均衡都涉及两种价格(模型1)或两种合同(模型2)。 )。因此,当不确定性较小时,预售市场或长期合同的存在并不重要,而当不确定性较大时,它会产生重要的福利后果。第三章,建立了具有非线性定价的结构寡头模型。我使用来自美国无线电话服务行业的数据估算模型。结构参数估计值用于预测政策选择的效果。我通过将实际结果与要求公司发布两部分关税的制度进行比较,来衡量非线性定价的福利后果。结论是,与经典的垄断模型类似,非线性定价可帮助企业获得更多利润,同时又会损害消费者。

著录项

  • 作者

    Macskasi, Zsolt.;

  • 作者单位

    Northwestern University.;

  • 授予单位 Northwestern University.;
  • 学科 Economics General.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2004
  • 页码 234 p.
  • 总页数 234
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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