Leadership style and diversionary theory of foreign policy: The use of diversionary strategies by Middle Eastern leaders during and in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War.

摘要

The diversionary theory of war is one of the most speculated about and debated theories in foreign policy literature. The theory argues that government leaders who are confronted with public antagonism over domestic economic, social, and political problems sometimes start wars to divert their populaces' attention from domestic problems and therefore to survive politically. Numerous foreign policy conflicts have been interpreted as being diversionary in nature and it has been commonplace for analysts to examine the domestic politics and problems of countries that engage in international conflict. Specifically, the use of force by US Presidents against external actors, such as U.S. President George H.W. Bush's operation against Grenada and the First Gulf War, and U.S. President Bill Clinton's operations against Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan and its supposed "rally round the flag effect" have been investigated by foreign policy experts.;In this dissertation, I address some limitations of the literature on the diversionary theory of war through some significant revisions. My revisions are intended to extend the scope and expand the content of the literature in order to transform the theory from a theory of war to a foreign policy theory. In addition, I try to contribute to the theoretical development of the literature by bringing the leader back into the diversionary theory and incorporating it into the current literature on foreign policy leadership studies. First, I argue that there are alternative ways for leaders to divert the attention of the domestic public other than the use of force, including less aggressive, less risky and less costly strategies, such as crisis building and escalation and peaceful foreign policy initiatives, such as presidential dramas, summits, and peacemaking ventures. Experts on public opinion, voting behavior, and scholars of presidential studies have demonstrated in previous studies the rallying effect of these different foreign policy actions. And some of the more recent studies have indicated the possibility of the domestic use of overseas trips, peace conferences and peaceful foreign policy gestures by US presidents. In fact, as scholars of foreign policy substitutability have stated, if there are alternative routes for foreign policy decision makers to attain their goals, then it would seem plausible that decision makers who are confronted with certain problems or subjected to certain stimuli would, under certain conditions, substitute one such route for another. In the context of diversionary behavior, a leader may employ one foreign policy response to divert attention from domestic problems in one circumstance, but then at a different time, employ a different foreign policy response. In fact, the idea of substitutability gives multiple foreign policy options for leaders to divert the domestic public's attention from domestic problems and this should be taken into consideration theoretically. In my study, I bring together the findings of different studies with diversionary literature in order to attain a more integrative approach in domestic politics and foreign policy linkage.;In addition, most of the studies on the diversionary theory of war have been conducted on the political use of force by US presidents, which rests on a false assumption that only US presidents have employed this strategy in their dealings with domestic opposition, that only leaders of democracies would need to use this strategy, and that only democracies with substantial economic and military power would be able to afford to use this strategy. The explanation advanced for these assumptions is twofold. First of all, the proponents of this view argue that authoritarian leaders can forcibly suppress any form of opposition or dissent in their countries and therefore need not be concerned with diverting the domestic public's attention away from domestic problems, whereas democratic leaders do not have the capacity to use excessive force against their citizens and therefore, in order to survive politically, must deflect the domestic public's attention away from domestic problems. Secondly, they argue that implementing foreign policies for domestic purposes may be extremely costly and risky and therefore only leaders of relatively affluent nations with considerable military power can use these strategies.;Contrary to these assumptions, studies on authoritarian regimes and authoritarian leaders have demonstrated that even the most authoritarian or totalitarian leaders have certain constituencies to whom they must pay attention and have accountability, such as the politburos, the political elites, or institutions, such as the military. Similar studies have shown that such leaders are also concerned about possible mass uprisings and therefore try to take into consideration people's reaction to their policies. In addition, as I argue above, there are ways of diverting the domestic public's attention that are less costly and risky than the strategies on which the diversionary theory has traditionally focused and therefore accessible to countries that are not affluent.;After these amendments, I focus on the relationship between political leaders and diversionary strategies, which has been neglected by scholars in the field. Mainstream scholarship has considered the act of diversion as an externalization of domestic problems and conflict to the realm of foreign policy. Most scholars who have propounded the diversionary theory of war have regarded political leaders, especially US presidents, as empty vessels in this process. Despite red flags by some reviewers of literature, these studies have neglected the role of leaders and the impact that political leaders can exert on this process. However, studies on leadership and literature on foreign policy decision making have manifested that leadership traits and styles matter in the making of foreign policy. These studies have also shown that although numerous domestic and international factors influence foreign policies, these influences are channeled through a decision maker who creates and implements the foreign policy. Bringing agency back into diversionary scholarship will shift the research focus from a simple question of whether domestic unrest provides leaders with an incentive to engage in diversionary conflict abroad to when it does, how their leadership style will influence the diversionary strategy chosen and implemented. In order to understand this relationship, we need to open the black box of the government and analyze the leadership traits of decision makers.;This dissertation focuses on Middle Eastern leaders who used diversionary strategies during the First Gulf War in 1991 and in its immediate aftermath. Some of the foreign policies of Hafiz Assad of Syria, King Hussein of Jordan, and Saddam Hussein of Iraq during this period have been interpreted as intended to divert the attention of their people and unify their people around their flags. These foreign policies will be analyzed in relation to the leadership traits of the three Middle Eastern political leaders.