Soviet war-readiness and the road to war: 1937--1941

摘要

This is a study of the foreign and domestic policies of the USSR as they pertain to its war-readiness, as well as the degree to which these policies presumably opened the door to the European conflagration and, in 1941, to the Nazi-Soviet war. Topics to be discussed include: (1) the crash industrialization of the Soviet Union and industrial war preparations from 1928--41; (2) the development of Soviet military doctrine before and after 12 June 1937; (3) a critical re-examination of the popularly accepted reasons for the devolution of the Soviet armed forces; and (4) Soviet foreign policy from 1937--41. The chronological end of the paper (1941) is followed by a brief epilogue discussing the evident success of the Soviet industrialization program by reference to Soviet industrial performance during the Nazi-Soviet war. Furthermore, the epilogue will challenge the popular depiction of the German invasion as an effortless, seamless advance into the Soviet heartland.