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Taking over: Federalism, deterrence, and the search for educational accountability.

机译:接管:联邦制,威慑力和寻求教育责任制。

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摘要

In many states, state education agencies may “take over” a school district whose performance they deem inadequate. They dismiss district officials and manage the district's affairs directly or through a designee. Although takeover seeks to improve management in taken-over districts, its primary goal is to hold all districts accountable by sanctioning poor performance.; This study proposes a model whereby states seek to induce districts to reform themselves by threatening takeover. Districts seek to preserve as many of their preferred, unreformed policies as possible while avoiding takeover. In this model districts reform just sufficiently to satisfy the state. If districts lack complete information regarding state preferences, however, districts sometimes underestimate the amount of reform required, and states seek to signal the credibility of their threats. Both these behaviors lead takeover threats to be realized.; Data on takeover threats confirm the predicted centrality of deterrence and state credibility. Takeover threats stimulate districts to undertake reforms they otherwise would likely have eschewed. Through lawsuits, political organizing, and noncooperation with state monitoring, districts also seek to convince states that takeover will fail because it will face staunch opposition among school staff and community hostility. Such resistance efforts impede state/district communication and cooperation in an environment already characterized by incomplete information.; Takeover's effects are further shaped by interaction with the complex “ecology of games” that characterizes educational politics. Thus takeover reduces minority-group power in local school politics. States generally support efforts by big-city mayors to wrest control of schools from districts, but find that such support depresses their own ability to deter and to signal credibility to other districts. Litigation that seeks to enhance local control in distressed school districts relies upon arguments that encourage states to implement takeovers, ironically reducing local power.; Takeover policies administer a complex, somewhat unpredictable shock to the system of educational federalism. They do, however, provide a way for states to induce reform in school districts without dictating what the reform should look like. Takeover's federal paradigm avoids many problems associated with both classic organization of schools as hierarchical bureaucracies and with transitions from bureaucracies to markets.
机译:在许多州,州教育机构可能会“接管”他们认为表现不佳的学区。他们解雇地区官员并直接或通过指定人员管理地区事务。尽管接管旨在改善被接管地区的管理,但其主要目标是通过制裁表现不佳使所有地区承担责任。这项研究提出了一个模型,通过该模型,各州试图通过威胁收购来诱使各地区进行自身改革。各地区在避免接管的同时,力求保留尽可能多的首选,未改革的政策。在这种模式下,地区改革足以满足国家的要求。但是,如果各地区缺乏有关国家偏好的完整信息,则各地区有时会低估所需的改革力度,各州试图表明其威胁的可信度。这两种行为都会导致接管威胁得以实现。关于收购威胁的数据证实了威慑和国家信誉的预测中心性。接管威胁会刺激各地区进行原本可以避免的改革。通过诉讼,政治组织以及不与州监督合作,各学区还试图说服各州,因为它将面临学校工作人员和社区敌对的强烈反对,所以收购将失败。这种抵抗努力阻碍了在已经以信息不完整为特征的环境中州/地区的沟通与合作。与具有教育政治特色的复杂“游戏生态”的互动,进一步影响了收购的影响。因此,接管降低了当地学校政治中的少数民族权力。各国通常支持大城市市长为从各地区夺取对学校的控制权所做的努力,但发现这种支持降低了他们自己的威慑能力,并暗示了其对其他地区的信誉。旨在加强对受困学区的地方控制的诉讼依赖于鼓励各州实施接管,具有讽刺意味的是降低地方权力的论点。接管政策对教育联邦制体系造成了复杂而又无法预测的冲击。但是,它们的确为各州提供了一种在学区中进行改革的方式,而无需规定改革的面貌。接管的联邦范式避免了许多与学校传统组织成等级官僚机构以及从官僚机构向市场过渡有关的许多问题。

著录项

  • 作者

    Saiger, Aaron.;

  • 作者单位

    Princeton University.;

  • 授予单位 Princeton University.;
  • 学科 Political Science Public Administration.; Education Administration.; Law.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2004
  • 页码 420 p.
  • 总页数 420
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 政治理论;教育;法律;
  • 关键词

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