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The Merits of Money and 'Muscle': Essays on Criminality, Elections and Democracy in India.

机译:金钱和“肌肉”的优点:印度犯罪,选举和民主论文。

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摘要

This dissertation seeks to understand how democratic elections can coexist with a significant number of politicians implicated in criminal wrongdoing. Specifically, it seeks answers to three questions. Why do parties nominate candidates with criminal backgrounds? Why do voters vote for them? And what does their proliferation mean for democratic accountability? To address these questions, I draw on a wide body of quantitative and qualitative evidence from India, the world's largest democracy. I argue that parties are attracted to criminal politicians because they have access to financial resources that allow them to function as self-financing candidates. Whereas the prevailing consensus in political economy suggests that voters support "bad politicians" because they lack adequate information on candidate quality, I develop an alternate theory that suggests well-informed voters can display rational behavior by voting for such candidates. Specifically, in contexts where social divisions are highly salient, voters often desire a representative who they perceive can protect group-based interests most credibly. In such settings, criminality can serve as a useful signal of a candidate's credibility. As a result, parties selectively field criminal candidates in those areas where social divisions are most pronounced. The implications of this study are far reaching because they suggest that information about a candidate's criminality is not only available, but actually is central to understanding the viability of his candidacy. Thus, there are circumstances in which "bad politicians" can in fact be compatible with democratic accountability. Empirically, this dissertation makes use of a unique, author-constructed database of affidavits submitted by more than 60,000 candidates contesting state and national elections between 2003 and 2009. This dataset contains detailed information on candidates' financial and criminal records from 37 elections, which I analyze using state-of-the-art quantitative methods. I complement these quantitative analyses with qualitative fieldwork conducted in three states, including an in-depth exploration of the case of Bihar, a state in north India.
机译:本文试图了解民主选举如何与大量涉嫌犯罪的政治家共存。具体来说,它寻求三个问题的答案。政党为什么要提名具有犯罪背景的候选人?为什么选民为他们投票?它们的扩散对民主问责意味着什么?为了解决这些问题,我借鉴了来自世界上最大的民主国家印度的大量定量和定性证据。我认为,政党之所以被犯罪政治家所吸引,是因为他们有获得财政资源的机会,可以使他们充当自负盈亏的候选人。鉴于政治经济学中的普遍共识表明选民支持“坏政客”,因为他们缺乏有关候选人素质的足够信息,但我提出了另一种理论,建议知情的选民可以通过对此类候选人进行投票来表现理性行为。具体而言,在社会分裂高度突出的情况下,选民通常希望他们认为可以最可靠地保护基于群体的利益的代表。在这种情况下,犯罪行为可以作为候选人可信度的有用信号。结果,当事方有选择地将犯罪候选人安置在社会分化最明显的地区。这项研究的意义是深远的,因为它们表明关于候选人的犯罪的信息不仅可用,而且实际上对于理解其候选人的可行性至关重要。因此,在某些情况下,“坏政客”实际上可以与民主问责制相适应。从经验上讲,本论文利用了一个由作者构建的独特的誓章数据库,该数据库由2003年至2009年间参加州和全国选举的60,000多名候选人提交了誓章。该数据集包含有关37次选举中候选人的财务和犯罪记录的详细信息,使用最新的定量方法进行分析。我用在三个州进行的定性实地调查来补充这些定量分析,包括对印度北部一个州比哈尔邦的案例进行的深入探索。

著录项

  • 作者

    Vaishnav, Milan.;

  • 作者单位

    Columbia University.;

  • 授予单位 Columbia University.;
  • 学科 Political Science General.;Sociology Criminology and Penology.;South Asian Studies.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2012
  • 页码 290 p.
  • 总页数 290
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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