Solid proof and vulgar bias: Hume's theory of causation (David Hume).

摘要

David Hume's theory of causation is widely viewed as a philosophical milestone, but Hume himself finds it deeply problematic. He tries at length but cannot locate a force or tie which binds causes and effects. As far as he can tell, the necessary connection between object-pairs is a projection of the mind.; Still, although Hume claims that it is a mistake to presume there is such a thing as objective causal power, he also claims that this proof, however solid, is irrelevant in the sense that our inferences will continue to issue as they always have. Put another way, causal necessity is not the only projection on review. When at the climax of the account, Hume compares his findings to common experience, or what he calls the reason of the vulgar, and when he sees that his conclusions do not reckon with it, he does not shrink from revising his conclusions.; Like Hume I believe that our general principles should submit to experience, and that one key way of abiding this is not just to gather up every case we can find, though that is important. We also need to recognize Hume's insight about the tendency to cast our thoughts and feelings on the world; otherwise the cases we gather might end up being mere projections of our own theoretical designs. The causal inquiry encourages such recognition in one sense by showing that necessity is something we spread on objects. But if that were all it did the account would only be critical, not self-critical. When Hume turns his insight about necessity on himself, confessing that he has been carried away by projections of his own, he shows an exceptional readiness to revise his principles in deference to common life. Hume is open to the counsel of experience, even at the cost of certain philosophical ambitions. In my view, this is what makes him such a good model for students and teachers of philosophy.