Strategic incentives in elections with heterogeneous information.

摘要

This dissertation analyzes the strategic incentives faced by voters and candidates in a common-value election setting, assuming a continuous distribution of expertise. Chapter 1 focuses on voters' participation incentives, given two fixed alternatives. As in the influential model of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996), relatively uninformed citizens abstain strategically in equilibrium, delegating to those with better information, providing an explanation for the otherwise difficult empirical correlation between information and voting, as well as the puzzling phenomenon of roll-off. Moderately informed citizens continue to vote, however, because a desire to inform the electoral decision, as in the Condorcet (1785) jury theorem, mitigates the swing voter's curse. In large electorates, these incentives balance one another to predict turnout levels close to 50% of the electorate, unlike existing strategic voting models, which invariably predict either unrealistically high or low levels of turnout. Chapter 2 finds strong empirical evidence of strategic abstention, using proxies of information quality such as education, age, and political knowledge: a citizen's own information makes her more likely to vote, but that the information of others within her electorate makes her more likely to abstain.;Chapter 3 generalizes the model of Chapter 1 to allow an entire continuum of policy alternatives. Heterogeneous beliefs among risk-averse voters produce single-peaked preferences over the policy interval, as in standard models. A standard median voter theorem arises if candidates are office-motivated and platform commitments are binding, though the common welfare argument in favor of political compromise does not apply in this setting. If candidates are policy-motivated then equilibrium platforms instead diverge, in response to informative voting. Vote totals are also informative: if platform commitments are not binding then a winning candidate responds to electoral mandates, becoming more extreme after a landslide victory, or more moderate after winning only narrowly. Votes for minor candidates also influence policy, even when these candidates are unlikely to win the election. The logic of the swing voter's curse no longer applies, but uninformed citizens nevertheless abstain in equilibrium, to avoid a signaling voter's curse of exerting too strong an influence on policy. Consistent with empirical evidence, then, ideologically extreme citizens are the most informed, and also the most likely to vote.;JEL Classification Number D72, D82;Keywords: Voting, Elections, Turnout, Information, Roll-off, Swing Voter's Curse, Jury Theorem