How can we understand conscious experience as a genuine part of the natural world? What explains the specific phenomenal character of experience, i.e. what the experience is like for the person? In recent decades, attempts to understand conscious experience have often appealed almost exclusively to the brain. In the case of perception, conscious experience has then typically been thought of as an inner model of the environment in the head of the perceiver. At the same time, however, the behavioral and cognitive sciences have become more sensitive to a broader range of processes, cutting across organism/environment divides. The actual manipulation of the environment can contribute to problem-solving, for example when someone moves around pieces of a puzzle to see where they might fit. Also the study of perception has increasingly focused on dynamic patterns of engagement with the environment. Active exploration plays a crucial role in perception, and it has become questionable whether it is helpful in the study of perception to assume that the brain contains inner models of the world. Indeed, some have argued that if the world is out there to explore, no inner model is required for perceptual experience at all. In my thesis I explore the consequences of this perspective for understanding the phenomenal character of experience. More particularly, I explicate, develop, and defend a sensorimotor approach. I argue that this approach can help to understand the phenomenal character of perceptual experience by focusing on the perceiver's sensorimotor engagement with the environment.
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