首页> 外文学位 >The limits of equality: An economic analysis of the Israeli Kibbutz.
【24h】

The limits of equality: An economic analysis of the Israeli Kibbutz.

机译:平等的局限:对以色列基布兹的经济分析。

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例

摘要

The Israeli Kibbutzim are thought-provoking organizations. In my dissertation, I identify an economic puzzle underlying the Kibbutzim's persistence, suggest an analytical approach that solves the puzzle, draw out the testable implications of that approach and then test those implications. As voluntary cooperatives based on equality in the distribution of income across members, standard theory suggests that they are potentially subject to unraveling due to severe problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. Yet, the Kibbutz movement successfully survived for most of the twentieth century and still seems, in large part, viable. Recently, however, a financial crisis hit the Kibbutzim and many Kibbutzim shift, for the first time in history, away from full equality by introducing various degrees of differential reforms. I build a simple theoretical framework to capture the main tradeoffs facing the Kibbutzim. My model makes predictions about the degree of equality that each Kibbutz would choose as well as predictions about the exit rates and the quality of migrants. I test the predictions of the model with both individual-level data sets and Kibbutz-level data sets assembled through field work in Israel.; A study of the Kibbutzim allows us to deal with fundamental questions in economics such as how insurance can be provided despite the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection, how moral hazard and adverse selection shape contractual relationships, and how these problems are solved in egalitarian partnerships. I address the following questions: how did the voluntary egalitarian Kibbutzim coexist with a more capitalist environment? What level of equality can be sustained within a Kibbutz as an equilibrium? What is the role of economic forces in the behavior of Kibbutzim and in members' migration decisions? I find that Kibbutzim are self-enforcing organizations, whose behavior is shaped by the tradeoffs between insurance and incentives. The analysis suggests that in the foreseeable future, the Kibbutzim can continue to survive in a changing economic environment, even if in an altered form.
机译:以色列的集体庄园是发人深省的组织。在我的论文中,我确定了基布兹的持久性背后的经济难题,提出了解决难题的分析方法,提出了该方法可检验的含义,然后测试了这些含义。作为基于成员之间收入分配平等的自愿合作社,标准理论表明,由于逆向选择和道德风险等严重问题,它们有可能遭到破坏。但是,基布兹运动在整个20世纪的大部分时间里都成功地幸存了下来,并且在很大程度上似乎仍然可行。然而,最近,一场金融危机席卷了基布兹,许多基布兹转变是有史以来的第一次,通过引入各种程度的差异化改革来摆脱完全平等。我建立了一个简单的理论框架来捕获基布兹(Kibbutzim)面临的主要折衷。我的模型对每个基布兹将选择的平等程度做出预测,并对退出率和移民质量做出预测。我通过以色列的现场工作,使用个人数据集和基布兹数据集测试了模型的预测。对基布兹的研究使我们能够处理经济学中的基本问题,例如尽管存在道德风险和逆向选择问题,如何提供保险;道德风险和逆向选择如何形成合同关系;以及在平等伙伴关系中如何解决这些问题? 。我要解决以下问题:自愿的平等主义者基布兹在怎样与更资本主义的环境共存?一个集体庄园内可以维持什么样的平等水平?经济力量在基布兹(Kibbutzim)的行为以及成员的迁徙决策中起什么作用?我发现基布兹(Kibbutzim)是自我执行的组织,其行为受保险与激励措施之间的权衡影响。分析表明,在可预见的将来,基布兹可以在不断变化的经济环境中继续生存,即使形式有所改变。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号