Revolutionary deterrence: The Sandinista response to Reagan's coercive policy against Nicaragua, lessons toward a theory of asymmetric conflict.

摘要

My dissertation critiques the great power bias and excessively narrow state-centrism that plagues IR theory. I use the case of U.S. coercion against the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) of Nicaragua to illustrate how these biases have caused scholars exploring asymmetric conflicts to overlook the agency of smaller powers. Because the FSLN's defensive responses "flew beneath the radar" of these scholars' unit of analysis (the state), the Sandinistas' strategies have not been included in previous explanations of why the Reagan Administration failed to achieve its objective. This is a general pattern in most of the IR literature. As a result, IR scholars have neglected less powerful international actors' strategies of resistance, which often rely on strong transnational social networks and the "soft power" of communication, framing, and persuasion by appeals to values, norms, and beliefs, to achieve their objectives. In contrast, I elaborate an empirically testable theoretical framework that can better explain cases of asymmetric conflicts between core and peripheral nations.; Specifically, I argue that the Nicaraguan's were able to successfully counter U.S. coercive policy by: implementing popular social reforms and creating mass organizations, rebuilding their defense apparatus on the basis of unconventional warfare, diplomatically undermining U.S. legitimacy, and fomenting U.S. domestic opposition to Reagan's policy via transnational sub-state actors (Central American Peace & Solidarity Movement---CAPM). These four factors combined synergistically in a policy I call Revolutionary Deterrence, which caused Reagan's coercive efforts to fail and more importantly deterred the U.S. from escalating the conflict. If this argument is correct I would expect to find several observable implications.; I derive and test several hypotheses that should be true if my explanation is correct. First, I show that the CAPM was not solely a domestic movement, but rather a transnational social movement. Second, I document that public opposition to Reagan's Central America policy was activated by the CAPM not Congressional elites. Third, I show that public support for Reagan's use of force in Nicaragua was weakened as a result of the CAPM's ability to offer a powerful counter-frame in the mainstream U.S. media that challenged the Administration's framing of its policy objective. These findings support the argument that the Sandinistas' strategies caused U.S. coercive efforts to fail and deterred the Reagan Administration from escalating the conflict.