Great expectations: Banking on development. The case of regional development banks.

摘要

Regional development banks (RDBs), designed by politicians and economists to maneuver the labyrinth of economic, social, and political development possess the potential to be central players in the long-term planning of healing poverty-plagued regions and advancing their economies. This formidable task offers the invaluable payoff of furthering global economic and financial stability and improving human welfare. Multilateral financial institutions have been an integral part of academic and policy debates and have come under increasing scrutiny. However, of the family of existing multilateral financial institutions, RDBs have received little attention in academic circles. The central puzzle of this study focuses on the tension between the development function of RDBs and their bank function. As this research shows, these institutions embody structures and operational policies that are similar to those of private sector banking and business. On the other hand, their formal arrangements and raison d'etre is to fill a certain development gap and (multilaterally) assist developing countries in the process of poverty alleviation and development. These often conflicting identities are set against the backdrop of the question of aid, development finance and the changing paradigms dominating the field. By comparing the four major RDBs (the Inter-American Development Bank, the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) I show that RDBs do not follow in the clear path of either a development agency or a bank. Despite their similar foundations structure, they produce varying outputs that are a product of the involvement of their members and their institutional climate. The conclusions, deduced from a large-N statistical analysis of the loans made by the RDBs since their creation, and a qualitative analysis based on interviews, archives, and secondary sources, are that: (1) RDBs do not have the same considerations as private banks, but also do not necessarily operate as catalysts for private investment in developing countries. (2) RDBs are risk averse and do not direct the bulk of their loans to the poorest countries in their regions. (3) RDBs are not entirely foreign policy tools of the powerful countries on the Board, but without hegemonic involvement they lack effectiveness and risk being marginalized.