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Software exclusivity decision in the presence of indirect network externality.

机译:存在间接网络外部性时的软件独占决策。

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摘要

In the presence of a positive indirect network externality (INE), the value of a hardware increases with the availability of software. Hardware manufacturers can thus gain competitive advantage by increasing the availability and variety of compatible software. When software and hardware manufacturers are not integrated (e.g., Video game industry), hardware makers (e.g., Sony, Nintendo, Microsoft), enter into a contract with independent software makers (e.g. Capcom, Rockstar) that stipulates whether or not the software should be exclusive to (i.e., compatible only with) the contracting hardware. An exclusive contract lets the INE advantage to remain with the contracting hardware maker. However, because an exclusive contract limits the market size for the software maker, a discount in royalty is given by the hardware manufacturer to the software maker.; In my dissertation, I use a game theoretical approach to study hardware manufacturer's decisions on software exclusivity and royalty contracts. Assuming a market with two hardware manufacturers with incompatible hardware platforms and a single software publisher and a single-period game, this paper examines the conditions under which an exclusive or a non-exclusive contract is optimal. The major findings are as follows: (1) Hardware manufacturers' exclusivity decisions: When INE effect is strong, hardware manufacturers consistently prefer using exclusive titles. However, when such effect is small and there is no strong substitution effect in the software market, both firms will favor Non-exclusive titles. (2) Hardware manufacturers' royalty rates decisions: In general, hardware manufacturers will reduce royalty rates when the software market is price sensitive. Furthermore, the INE effect may also affect hardware manufacturers' decisions on royalty rates. (3) Hardware manufacturers' discount rates decisions: When consumers prefer software variety, the hardware manufacturer will offer a positive discount for her exclusive software title.; This research incorporates the INE effect into hardware manufacturer's exclusivity and pricing strategies. The results of this paper highlight some important managerial insights for hardware manufacturers and could be generalized into other industries where INE effect exists.
机译:在存在积极的间接网络外部性(INE)的情况下,硬件的价值会随着软件的可用性而增加。因此,硬件制造商可以通过增加兼容软件的可用性和种类来获得竞争优势。当软件和硬件制造商(例如视频游戏产业)未集成时,硬件制造商(例如索尼,任天堂,微软)应与独立软件制造商(例如Capcom,Rockstar)订立合同,规定是否应是订约硬件专有的(即,仅与之兼容)。独家合同使INE的优势仍保留在承包商硬件制造商的手中。但是,由于排他性合同限制了软件制造商的市场规模,因此硬件制造商会向软件制造商提供特许权使用费折扣。在本文中,我使用博弈论的方法来研究硬件制造商在软件专有性和使用费合同方面的决策。假设市场上有两个硬件制造商具有不兼容的硬件平台,并且有一个软件发行商和一个周期的游戏,则本文研究了排他性合同或非排他性合同最优的条件。主要发现如下:(1)硬件制造商的排他性决定:当INE效果很强时,硬件制造商始终喜欢使用专有标题。但是,当这种影响很小并且在软件市场中没有强大的替代作用时,两家公司都将青睐非专有标题。 (2)硬件制造商的特许权使用费率决定:通常,当软件市场对价格敏感时,硬件制造商将降低特许权使用费率。此外,INE效应还可能影响硬件制造商对特许权使用费率的决定。 (3)硬件制造商的折扣率决定:当消费者喜欢软件品种时,硬件制造商将为其专有软件标题提供正折扣。这项研究将INE效应纳入了硬件制造商的排他性和定价策略。本文的结果突出了对硬件制造商的一些重要管理见解,并且可以推广到存在INE效应的其他行业。

著录项

  • 作者

    Yang, Jun.;

  • 作者单位

    Syracuse University.;

  • 授予单位 Syracuse University.;
  • 学科 Business Administration Marketing.; Economics General.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2005
  • 页码 169 p.
  • 总页数 169
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 贸易经济;经济学;
  • 关键词

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