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Essays on mail-in rebates.

机译:关于邮寄回赠的论文。

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Essay 1: Mail-in rebate promotions. Time inconsistent preferences or price discrimination? Mail-in rebates are a widely employed marketing tool (Grow 2005). Previous research suggests two mechanisms by which mail-in rebate promotions can enhance marketer profits: time-inconsistent preferences (Soman 1998) and price-discrimination via self-selection (Narasimhan 1984). Despite these investigations, not much is known about the relative salience of these mechanisms in influencing the profitability of rebate promotions. Accordingly, the primary objective of this research is to redress this gap. Across a series of experimental tasks involving simulated rebate offers, we do find evidence for time-inconsistent preferences across the "choice" and "redemption" decisions. However, the ability of marketers to capitalize on these time-inconsistent preferences is limited. In addition, we find that: (i) Redemption rates are higher when subjects are given a choice to accept a rebate offer than when they are simply given a rebate offer, signifying high levels of self-selection, (ii) An individual-specific trait, namely, the construct of "rebate involvement," has a significant impact on rebate choice even after controlling for face value and redemption effort. Moreover, this trait is positively correlated with a measure of price consciousness, and (iii) Subjects exposed to a subsequent rebate offer update their choices in a manner that reflects significant levels of learning. Overall, these findings suggest that only the price-discrimination mechanism remains as a viable mechanism to yield enhanced profits in the deployment of rebates.; Essay 2: The impact of post-purchase satisfaction on the likelihood of rebate redemption. In a recent analytical paper, Chen, Moorthy, and Zhang (2005) begin with the premise that the likelihood of rebate redemption is linked to post-purchase states such as satisfaction. Employing this premise, they demonstrate that rebates can potentially serve as a price-discrimination tool across post-purchase states. Following their work, the main objective in this study is to empirically test the validity of their basic premise. Specifically, we hypothesize that when consumers are highly satisfied with purchase, they will be less likely to redeem rebates. In contrast, when consumers are dissatisfied with purchase, they will be more motivated to redress the situation by redeeming a rebate. In addition to its theoretical interest, the answer to this question will also determine if it is worthwhile to target rebate redeemers with additional marketing offers. For example, if dissatisfied consumers tend to redeem rebates at higher rates, they are poor candidates for additional marketing efforts even though the cost of targeting them is relatively low.; Key words. Mail-in rebates, time-inconsistent preferences, price-discrimination, satisfaction
机译:文章1:邮寄返现促销。时间不一致的偏好还是价格歧视?邮寄回扣是一种广泛使用的营销工具(Grow 2005)。先前的研究表明,邮寄返利促销可以通过两种机制提高营销商的利润:时间不一致的偏好(Soman 1998)和通过自我选择进行价格歧视(Narasimhan 1984)。尽管进行了这些调查,但对于这些机制在影响返利促销的盈利能力方面的相对重要性了解甚少。因此,这项研究的主要目的是弥补这一差距。在涉及模拟回扣优惠的一系列实验任务中,我们确实发现了“选择”和“赎回”决策中时间不一致偏好的证据。但是,营销人员利用这些时间不一致的偏好的能力是有限的。此外,我们发现:(i)给予对象选择接受折扣优惠的赎回率要比单纯给予折扣的参与者高,这表明自我选择水平高;(ii)针对特定个人的特质,即“回扣参与”的构造,即使控制了票面价值和赎回努力,也对回扣选择产生了重大影响。此外,此特征与价格意识的度量呈正相关,并且(iii)受到后续折扣优惠的对象以反映重要学习水平的方式更新他们的选择。总体而言,这些发现表明,只有价格歧视机制仍然是可行的机制,可以在回扣部署中产生更高的利润。文章2:购买后满意度对回赠率的影响。在最近的一篇分析论文中,Chen,Moorthy和Zhang(2005)提出了前提,即回扣的可能性与购买后的状态(如满意度)有关。以此为前提,他们证明了回扣可以潜在地成为跨购买后国家的价格歧视工具。在他们的工作之后,本研究的主要目的是通过经验检验其基本前提的有效性。具体来说,我们假设当消费者对购买高度满意时,他们将不太可能兑换折扣。相反,当消费者对购买不满意时,他们将更有动力通过赎回折扣来解决这种情况。除了其理论上的兴趣外,该问题的答案还将确定是否有必要针对具有额外市场营销优惠的回扣赎回者。例如,如果不满意的消费者倾向于以更高的比率兑换回扣,那么即使针对他们的成本相对较低,他们也不适合进行额外的营销工作。关键字邮寄回扣,时间不一致的偏好,价格歧视,满意度

著录项

  • 作者

    Choi, Beomjoon.;

  • 作者单位

    University of Kansas.;

  • 授予单位 University of Kansas.;
  • 学科 Business Administration Marketing.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2007
  • 页码 67 p.
  • 总页数 67
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 贸易经济;
  • 关键词

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