The political economy of banking regulation in Latin America during the 1990s: Mexico and Venezuela in comparative perspective (Argentina, Korea).

摘要

This dissertation constructs and evaluates a theoretical argument for analyzing post-crisis banking policy outcomes in democracies. It seeks to explain why there was considerable inter- and intra-country variation in banking policy outcomes in Latin America after financial crises during the 1990s. The theoretical arguments are evaluated with empirical data utilizing a cross-sectional and longitudinal qualitative research design. The data is drawn from extensive field work in Mexico and Venezuela, as well as readily and not-so-readily available secondary sources. Evidence from the Argentine and South Korean episodes during the 1990s is also evaluated in less detail to evaluate the theoretical propositions.; The dissertation contributes to extant theoretical debates, which remain divided with respect to the effects of electoral competition and fragmentation on economic policy reforms in developing countries in general and Latin America in particular. The dissertation's main argument, other factors equal, is that high levels of electoral competition among and within political parties increase the likelihood of banking reform in the aftermath of a financial crisis. A crisis, combined with electoral competition, will increase the political cost of regulatory forbearance and increase the likelihood that elected officials will pursue reform. However, where electoral competition among or within political parties is limited, I argue that variation in the economic-cum-political clout of socioeconomic groups explains outcomes in a straightforward fashion.; Patterns of banking policy outcomes in Mexico and Venezuela during the 1990s lend support to this dissertation's theoretical arguments. These countries represent particularly challenging cases because outcomes were unexpected to both casual and theoretically informed observers. In both countries there was considerable variation in levels of electoral competition and banking policy outcomes tended to improve with higher levels of electoral competition and eroded with lower levels. Within the framework of my research design, the evidence from the four countries suggests that these trends cannot be readily explained by alternative and complementary arguments that stress economic factors, the technical capacity of bureaucracies and policymakers, or countries' geopolitical significance.