Trade liberalization in Bangladesh: An international political economy perspective.

摘要

Utilizing International Political Economy (IPE) perspectives, I analyze trade reform policies in Bangladesh under the research query: What were the major forces for trade liberalization in Bangladesh? In particular, what were the relative importance of donors, the government and domestic pressure groups? I examine these questions at the aggregate and sectoral level.; Extending Robert Putman's two-level bargaining game, I classify the IPE models as follows: Autonomous Government driven by international organizations (AGIO); Autonomous Government following Statist policies (AGS); Bureaucratic Politics (BP); Domestic Politics influenced by interest groups (DPIG); and Domestic Politics influenced by the general public (DPGP). Modifying previous classifications of the trade reform period by various authors (mostly World Bank), I distinguish four phases of trade liberalization: Phase 1 (1971-1982); Phase 2 (1982-1991); Phase 3 (1992-1996) and Phase 4 (1997-present). I qualitatively examine the nature of the trade liberalization during these phases with respect to my IPE models.; Examining my research query in terms of contingent generalizations, I found that no one particular model dominated all of the different phases. It did appear that the AGS model seemed relatively more prevalent in Phase 1 and for most of Phase 2, given that the donors were mostly less significant (less role of AGIO) and that the autocratic government had overwhelmed interest groups and bureaucratic politics, under military pressure and realism. The end of Phase 2 and most of Phase 3 appeared to provide relatively more credibility to the AGIO model, given that democracy had surfaced explicitly and donors were driving most of the momentum of reform. Phase 4 was more a relative combination of BP and DPIG, with some reasserting of the AGS model, though under a democratic guise.; Presenting a case study on the Livestock and Poultry sector, I apply Coplin and Leary's (1983) "Prince Model," focusing on the 1994 ban on eggs. I found that the DPIG model had primarily driven the eventual ban with secondary support from the BP and the AGS models. This indicates the need for further sectoral studies to understand the full nature of the trade liberalization process in Bangladesh.