Money Flows, Water Trickles: Decentralized Service Delivery Under Hegemonic Party Rule.

摘要

This dissertation focuses on Tanzania, a hegemonic party regime where nearly half of the population lacks access to a clean and safe source of drinking water despite massive investments in this sector in recent years. In order to make sense of this disconnect between spending and improved outcomes, I analyze novel data on financial allocations and infrastructure construction for water provision, contextualized by public opinion surveys, interviews and focus group discussions conducted during six months of fieldwork. I find that Tanzania's strategy of decentralizing water provision to local governments has largely failed to promote responsiveness to local needs, due to local capture and politicized misallocation. I demonstrate how politicians have skewed resource distribution in such a way that favors their core supporters at the expense of demonstrably needier constituents. At the same time, citizens have been unable to compel responses to their needs given the lack of credible alternatives to the ruling party, as well as confusion over government responsibility for water provision, low expectations of self-efficacy and collective action, and entrenched gender norms. My study adds to the rich literature on decentralization by illuminating the challenges it can encounter in the context of a hegemonic party regime. By illuminating the role of local politics, my dissertation also adds to our understanding of how hegemonic party regimes -- the most common type of authoritarian rule in the post-World War II period -- survive and endure.