Lobbying the European Union versus lobbying the United States: A contribution to formal theory.

摘要

This dissertation takes a game-theoretic approach to the study of voting in the presence of lobbies and an external agenda setter. We develop several formal models of voting, each proceeding from a set of institutional assumptions drawn from extant political structures.;Chapter 1 constructs a model of lobbying in European Union Trade policy formation, and juxtaposes results with Grossman and Helpman's [1994] model of US trade policy in order to explain observed differences in tariff patterns. I prove that, if only national lobbies are active, the agenda setter can reach any point in the policy space. Applied to the European Union, this implies that a free-trade-biased Commission can lower tariffs even if all legislators and all lobbies are opposed. Lobbies can counteract the agenda setter's power by organizing transnationally. If contributions are conditional on the entire voting profile, such a 'transnational lobby' can veto any proposal at no cost. If contributions are conditional on the votes of each recipient legislator, the transnational lobby has only to possess a greater willingness to pay than the median national lobby to achieve this result.;Using the theoretical frameworks of Chapter 1 as starting points, subsequent chapters extend results both to more general theoretical assumptions and to particular empirical settings. In Chapter 3 (joint with Douglas Bernheim), we generalize the agenda power result to a generic policy space. In Chapter 5 (joint with Kenneth Shepsle), the transnational-lobby framework is applied to study the selection and approval of US Supreme Court nominees. Chapter 7 (joint with Gianmarco Ottaviano) returns to a direct comparison between United States and European lobbying. We investigate lobbying under majoritarian versus proportional systems, and corresponding effects on welfare. Within parameters that comport with observed empirical data, we show that lobbying under the majoritarian system is welfare-improving, while lobbying creates higher distortions in the proportional system.