In the last twenty years private actors including firms, business associations, and environmentalist groups have created dozens of regulatory programs that promote enhanced environmental practices worldwide. The study asks why it is that two global programs, the Forest Stewardship Council and the chemical industry's Responsible Care program, are more effective in Brazil than in Argentina despite similar national economic and regulatory conditions supportive of private environmental regulation.; Theorists of global governance attribute the effectiveness of these programs to market demand and advocacy by transnational firms and NGOs. Studies of private regulation in North America and Europe highlight the importance of government regulation and the advantages of industry concentration. I develop a theoretical model that synthesizes these theories into four propositions: (1) market benefits drive participation, (2) transnational firms and NGOs are powerful advocates, (3) local governments provide or withhold local legitimacy, and (4) highly concentrated industries are more capable of organizing effective programs.; In-depth case studies in Argentina and Brazil show that none of these explanations is satisfactory. Variation in program effectiveness does not result from differences in market returns, the actions of transnational actors, government involvement, or industry concentration as much as from differences in local organizational capacity. This capacity is a function of previous industrial policies and environmental crises, experiences that shape the structures and cultures of national industries and the aptitude of local communities to respond to opportunities for private regulation.; In Brazil, developmental industrialization policies and past environmental crises generated competitive national industries open to collaborative environmental programs from abroad, and networks among environmental groups and firms that provide essential operational support to these programs. Argentina's industrial policy encouraged rent-seeking and created industries that are chary of foreign models, reluctant to invest in collaboration with other stakeholders, and disinterested generally in environmental practice beyond legal compliance.; National variations in the effectiveness of these private programs limit their viability as sources of global standardization, and increase their utility as sources of competitive advantage rather than as tools for collective environmental management. However, programs with open participatory administrative structures are more effective across a wider range of conditions than those directed by industry groups alone.
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