When and why do treaties work? Commitment and compliance in international economic, human rights, and environmental law.

摘要

When and why do states abide by their international legal commitments? Several scholars view compliance as evidence that international law alters and/or imposes considerable restraints on state behavior. Yet as others point out, states might comply because the international legal commitment compels them to do so, but equally they might comply because they sign treaties that require little departure from what they would have done in the absence of an agreement. This dissertation examines these and related questions.; In the economics issue-area, I examine Article VIII of the International Monetary Fund Treaty. I argue that Article VIII primarily serves a 'screening' function: its 'effectiveness' lies not in increasing the costs states will pay if they renege, but rather in generating ex ante costs, which can provide a credible signal of policy intentions. Analyses of the relationship between the partisan composition of government and commitment to/compliance with Article VIII provide substantial support for my argument and little evidence that a constraining process is at play.; Human rights treaties rarely serve a screening function; yet they also generally lack the ex post engines of compliance that often drive cooperation in other issue-areas. I argue that a key to understanding commitment to and compliance with these agreements lies in domestic enforcement. When the latter is likely, states will tend to be 'selective' about ratification. When it is unlikely, there is little reason to believe that ratification will be associated with improved human rights conditions---before or after commitment. I examine and find support for these arguments in statistical analyses of two international human rights conventions.; Finally, in the realm of international environmental law, I consider variation in the design of the treaty itself. If, as others have argued, 'hard' international law is more likely than 'soft' law to be enforced, this has important implications for the initial decision to commit. States should be fairly 'selective' about assuming hard obligations, but there is little reason to expect that ratification of soft law will be associated with improved behavior. An examination of the relationship between compliant behavior, legalization, and ratification in the international climate change regime lends substantial support to these arguments.