声明
Table of Contents
ABBREVIATIONS
摘要
Abstract
Chapter 1:Introduction
1.1 Rationale of the study
1.1.1 Defining Environmental Protection as a Global Public Good
1.1.2 Global Public Goods for global environmental issues
1.1.3 Relevance for international cooperation
1.2 Philosophical argument of thesis
1.2.1 Interplay among the Global,Public and Local societies for Global Public Good
1.3 Theoretical Stance
1.4 Critical analysis of Policy Discourse
1.4.1 Benefits of Environmental Global Public Goods at Different scales
1.5 Introduction to Central Concepts
1.5.1 Internation Agreements for the protection of the Environment
1.5.2 Institutional design
1.5.3 Some principal for designing an institution
1.6 Research Questions
1.7 Study Objective
1.8 Chapters Outlines
Chapter 2:-The Literature background and Critiques
2.1 Introduction
2.2.1 Environment as a global public good:Literature background
2.3 A literature of the Mechanisms Adopted to Increase the Effectiveness of the Provision of Global Public Goods
Conclusion
Chapter 3:-Formulation of Game Theoretic Modeling for Climate Change
3.1 Coalitionai structure for two stage game
3.2.Stability of the coalition
Conclusion
Chapter 4:-Cost Allocation for the Problem of Pollution Reduction.A Dynamic Cooperative Game Approach
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Dynamic Game Model
4.2.The Nash Equilibrium
4.2.1 Value Function
4.3 Cooperative Solution of the Emission Reduction Game Model
4.3.1 All Possible Coalition Outcomes
4.4 Shapley Value Computation
4.5 Allocation of the Shapley value
Conclusion
Chapter 5:-Empirical Background of the Game Theoretic Modeling
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Emissions and Concentration
5.3.Global Damage Cost Function
5.4 Global and regional benefit Functions
5.5 Derivation of Abatement Cost Functions
5.6 The singleton coalition and grand coalition
5.7 Stable Coalitions without Commitments
5.8 Stable Coalitions under Commitments
5.1 Imperfect Coalitions
Chapter 6:Policy Implications.Future Research and Conclusion
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Policy Implications and Discussions
6.3 Direetions for Further Research
References
Appendix