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Prisoners' Dilemma of Endogenous Spillovers and Investment Equilibrium Strategies of Exogenous Spillovers

机译:内源性溢出的囚徒困境和外源性溢出的投资均衡策略

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This paper develops two stage duopoly models involving 'technology effect', via which R&D spillovers and investment strategies are analyzed for duopoly with a technologic differentiated product. Our work indicates that endogenous spillover will present 'Prisoners' Dilemma' phenomena and equilibrium levels of enterprises' endogenous spillover can reach the minimum when R&D endogenous spillover is considered as a controllable decision-making variable, in addition, the investment in exogenous spillover will be valuable while the equilibrium return brought by exogenous spillover is lower than optimal return.
机译:本文建立了涉及“技术效应”的两个阶段的双头垄断模型,通过该模型分析了技术溢出产品的双头垄断的研发溢出和投资策略。我们的工作表明,将研发内生溢出作为可控制的决策变量,内生溢出将呈现“囚徒困境”现象,企业内生溢出的均衡水平可以达到最小值,此外,外生溢出的投资将是有价值的,而外生溢出带来的均衡回报却低于最优回报。

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