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Countering Persistent Kernel Rootkits through Systematic Hook Discovery

机译:通过系统挂钩发现反击持久性内核Rootkit

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Kernel rootkits, as one of the most elusive types of malware, pose significant challenges for investigation and defense. Among the most notable are persistent kernel rootkits, a special type of kernel rootkits that implant persistent kernel hooks to tamper with the kernel execution to hide their presence. To defend against them, an effective approach is to first identify those kernel hooks and then protect them from being manipulated by these rootkits. In this paper, we focus on the first step by proposing a systematic approach to identify those kernel hooks. Our approach is based on two key observations: First, rootkits by design will attempt to hide its presence from all running rootkit-detection software including various system utility programs (e.g., ps and ls). Second, to manipulate OS kernel control-flows, persistent kernel rootkits by their nature will implant kernel hooks on the corresponding kernel-side execution paths invoked by the security programs. In other words, for any persistent kernel rootkit, either it is detectable by a security program or it has to tamper with one of the kernel hooks on the corresponding kernel-side execution path(s) of the security program. As a result, given an authentic security program, we only need to monitor and analyze its kernel-side execution paths to identify the related set of kernel hooks that could be potentially hijacked for evasion. We have built a proof-of-concept system called HookMap and evaluated it with a number of Linux utility programs such as ls, ps, and netstat in RedHat Fedora Core 5. Our system found that there exist 35 kernel hooks in the kernel-side execution path of ls that can be potentially hijacked for manipulation (e.g., for hiding files). Similarly, there are 85 kernel hooks for ps and 51 kernel hooks for netstat, which can be respectively hooked for hiding processes and network activities. A manual analysis of eight real-world rootkits shows that our identified kernel hooks cover all those used in them.
机译:内核Rootkit作为最难以捉摸的恶意软件之一,对调查和防御提出了严峻的挑战。其中最引人注目的是持久性内核rootkit,这是一种特殊类型的内核rootkit,其植入了持久性内核挂钩以篡改内核执行以隐藏其存在。为了抵御它们,一种有效的方法是首先识别那些内核挂钩,然后保护它们免受这些rootkit的操纵。在本文中,我们将重点放在第一步,即提出一种系统的方法来识别那些内核挂钩。我们的方法基于两个主要观察结果:首先,根据设计,rootkit会尝试从所有正在运行的rootkit检测软件(包括各种系统实用程序(例如ps和ls))中隐藏其存在。其次,为了操纵OS内核控制流,持久内核rootkit的性质将在安全程序调用的相应内核侧执行路径上植入内核钩子。换句话说,对于任何持久性内核rootkit,它要么可由安全程序检测到,要么必须篡改安全程序相应内核侧执行路径上的内核挂钩之一。结果,给定一个可靠的安全程序,我们只需监视和分析其内核侧执行路径,以识别可能被劫持以逃避的相关内核钩子集。我们建立了一个名为HookMap的概念验证系统,并使用RedHat Fedora Core 5中的许多Linux实用程序程序(例如ls,ps和netstat)对其进行了评估。我们的系统发现,内核端存在35个内核挂钩。 ls的执行路径,可能会被劫持以进行操纵(例如,用于隐藏文件)。同样,有ps的85个内核钩子和netstat的51个内核钩子,可以分别钩住它们以隐藏进程和网络活动。对八个实际rootkit的手动分析显示,我们确定的内核挂钩涵盖了其中使用的所有内核挂钩。

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