Analysis of incentive strategies of ordnance material supplier direct delivery based on stackelberg model

摘要

The just-in-time (JIT) delivery is the most important aim of ordnance material supplier direct delivery support (SDDS). However, different profit targets determine the leader-follower game relationship between ordnance material support organization and supplier. Therefore, the objective compatible incentive strategy to supplier should be adopted to improve the capability of JIT delivery. On the premise of uncertainty of demand, the optimal incentive strategy to supplier is obtained by the Stackelberg model of ordnance material supplier direct delivery incentive. First, the model analyzes the necessary condition of the existence of optimum delivery time and incentive. Then, the model further interprets the relationship between correlative parameters and optimal solution. In conclusion, the incentive to supplier can improve the capability of JIT delivery, but the different optimum incentive strategies should be carried out by the relative parameters.