Evolutionary Game Analysis of Supervision Strategy for Industrial Injury Insurance for Migrant Workers in the SMEs

摘要

Migrant workers had made great contributions for China's economic construction. In order to protect the interests of migrant workers, our country had developed a series of policies and regulations and carried out a series of actions. But since the vast majority of migrant workers work in small and medium enterprises, they have some unique features, measures are not well implemented. The SMEs collusion with the local authorities do not buy injury insurance for migrant workers, or impede the work injury insurance for migrant workers protection. In this paper we established a game between SMEs and the central ministries, discussed and disclosed the effect of individuals' choice of policy on group behavior based on analyzing evolution model of interacting process. This paper also showed the influence of the change of initial conditions and the parameter value on evolution affecting the result using the numerical simulation. The research found that if we want to improve the nation working efficiency, especially in protecting migrant workers' rights, we should rely on social intermediary agents to carry out security supervision on the SMEs.