The Relationship between Executive Salary Stickiness, Equity Checks and Balances and Enterprise Innovation Investment based on Multiple Regression Model

摘要

This article mainly analyzes the internal relationship between the stickiness of corporate executive compensation and corporate innovation investment, and studies the influence of the degree of equity checks and balances on the relationship between shareholders on the design of executive compensation and the investment of innovation. This paper selects all A-shares listed companies in China from 2015 to 2017 as the research object, and conducts a large sample regression on them. It is found that there is indeed a positive correlation between the stickiness of executive compensation and corporate innovation input. And use the degree of equity checks and balances as a moderating variable. Returning, it is found that equity checks and balances can negatively regulate the positive correlation between the stickiness of executive compensation and corporate innovation investment. This study shows that executive compensation stickiness is a compensation mechanism that tolerates managerial failure, and it is beneficial for enterprises to make innovation investment by properly allowing managerial investment failure, and the reasonable equity balance can also form an effective supervision mechanism to the management innovation investment behavior.