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Supply chain financing equilibrium with two lenders competition

机译:供应链融资均衡与两个贷款人竞争

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In this paper we consider a two-level supply chain with a single retailer and a manufacturer, where both the firms are facing financial constraints and cannot produce/order their optimal quantity. Both manufacturer and retailer have opportunities to lend from two lenders. Firstly the lender make decisions on whether finance the manufacturer or retailer or both, Then decide the amount of loan and interest rate to minimize the risk and maximize profits. The manufacturer will decide on which lender to lend that makes two lenders compete with each other. Our work shows that the lender tend to finance manufacturer and retailer both and get a equilibrium interest rate. Periodic review echelon order-up-to policies are used to control the chain. Customer demand is imposed at end stock-points and, if unsatisfied, is backordered. We address this problem from a dynamic optimization of local decisions point of view, to ensure a global optimum for the supply chain performance.
机译:在本文中,我们考虑了一个双层供应链,其中一个零售商和制造商,这些公司都面临财务限制,不能产生/订购最佳数量。 两个制造商和零售商都有机会借出两个贷方。 首先,贷款人决定是否为制造商或零售商或两者提供资金,然后决定最大限度地减少风险和利润最大限度地减少贷款和利率。 制造商将决定哪种贷款人借出,这使得两个贷款人互相竞争。 我们的工作表明,贷方倾向于融资制造商和零售商,并获得均衡利率。 定期审查Echelon Order-Up-to策略用于控制链。 客户需求在末端库存点施加,如果不满意,则延期交货。 我们从局部决策的动态优化来解决这个问题,以确保为供应链性能的全球最佳。

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