Service Quality Decision in Service Supply Chain Considering Supervision Behavior Based on Quantum Game

摘要

Service quality decisions of both members in service supply chain consisting of one service integrator and one service provider with stochastic demand are investigated, wherein service integrator supervises the service quality of service provider. By considering service quality and supervision level, members' profit functions are established. Meanwhile, based on quantum game, Nash equilibrium and quantum equilibrium are used to optimize the models. The optimal service quality of two members are obtained. Finally, mathematical reasoning and numerical simulations demonstrate that (1) quantum equilibrium solutions are superior to Nash equilibrium solutions under certain condition. If entanglement degree equals to zero, equilibrium solutions of quantum game are the same as the results of Nash equilibrium. (2) Service quality of service integrator increases in entanglement degree and decreases in supervision level. (3) Service quality of service provider decreases in entanglement degree and increases in supervision level.