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Verifying a Privacy CA Remote Attestation Protocol

机译:验证隐私CA Remote Attestation协议

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As the hardware root-of-trust in a trusted computing environment, the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) warrants formal specification and verification. This work presents results of an effort to specify and verify an abstract TPM 1.2 model using PVS that is useful for understanding the TPM and verifying protocols that utilize it. TPM commands are specified as state transformations and sequenced to represent protocols using a state monad. Postconditions and invariants are specified for individual commands and validated by verifying a Privacy CA attestation protocol. All specifications are written and verified automatically using the PVS decision procedures and rewriting system.
机译:作为信任计算环境中的硬件无信任,可信平台模块(TPM)保证正式规范和验证。这项工作介绍了使用PVS指定和验证抽象TPM 1.2型号的努力的结果,这些模型可用于了解使用它的TPM和验证协议。 TPM命令被指定为状态转换,并使用状态Monad表示协议。为单个命令指定了后兴和不变性,并通过验证隐私CA认证协议来验证。使用PVS决策程序和重写系统自动编写和验证所有规格。

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