Study on Regional Economic Cooperation System Among Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Based on Repeated Game

摘要

The study has found that there are many difficulties and barriers on regional economic cooperation among Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, for example, apparent convergence of industrial structure, duplicating construction and vicious competition in attracting external investment, etc., which presents Prisoners' Dilemma. Traditional regional economic theory can't design specific cooperation system. Cooperation game and coordination game can't provide operational implementation plan. According to principles of repeated game, the paper designs the payoff function of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei and solves the game equilibrium and crucial variable in order to construct regional economic cooperation system achieving Pareto optimal equilibrium of the game. The paper points out that infinitely repeated game is the essence of the coordination game among BeijingTianjin-Hebei. The equilibrium of the coordination game shows that the Pareto optimal equilibrium in each stage is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this infinitely repeated game when the tolerance degree of income recovery of both players is higher than the given value. This condition is satisfied more possibly when the following measures are taken: Term limits of officials of local government need to be prolonged, and accountability system of officials should be set up when they leave, which force the officials focusing on long-term interests than shortterm performance; Market-oriented reform on resource pricing and management system reform on environmental protection should be accelerated, tax incentives executed by officials should be strictly supervised; During the process of regional economic cooperation, reducing government intervention in enterprise decision, the decision mode should be changed from government-led to enterprise-oriented and governmentassisted.