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The Optimal Cost-Sharing Incentive Model of Main Manufacturer-Suppliers for Complex Equipment under Grey Information

机译:灰色信息下复杂设备的主要制造商 - 供应商的最佳成本共享激励模型

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Based on the uncertainty and grey level of suppliers' efforts, the paper put forward the incentive strategy of main manufacturer sharing the suppliers' efforts cost, and established the optimal cost-sharing model under grey effort level. The paper calculated Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg equilibrium under the above incentive model, and came to the optimal proportion, the optimal effort level and the optimal income of main manufacturer sharing the supplier' development cost. It analyzed that the cooperation status between the main manufacturer and suppliers shifts from Nash equilibrium to Stackelberg equilibrium, and effective cost-sharing incentive program can achieve profits to growth and the effort level of the main manufacturer and suppliers to improve, proving that cooperation between the main manufacturer and suppliers achieves the possibility of Pareto improvement.
机译:根据供应商努力的不确定性和灰度水平,本文提出了主要制造商的激励策略,分享供应商的努力成本,并在灰色努力水平下建立了最佳成本共享模型。本文在上述激励模型下计算了纳什均衡和Stackelberg均衡,并达到了最佳的比例,最佳努力水平和主要制造商的最佳收入分担了供应商的发展成本。它分析了主要制造商和供应商之间的合作地位从纳什均衡转向Stackelberg均衡,有效的成本分享激励计划可以实现增长的利润和主要制造商和供应商的努力,从而证明这方面的合作主要制造商和供应商实现了Pareto改善的可能性。

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