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Relationship Between the Compensation of Executives and the Failure of American Investment Banks: A Study Based on Goldman Brothers

机译:高管薪酬与美国投资银行失败之间的关系:基于高盛兄弟的研究

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The American subprime crisis starts the global financial crisis which caused the global economy to suffer the serious attack. The five American famous investment banks dropped down in crisis. On the basis of five investment banks' relevant issues, including the Goldman Brothers compensation data, the paper gives the quantitative analysis, discovered Goldman Brothers' salary system flaw, showed the unreasonable salary system throws the important reason which the line went out of business. Excessive short-term droved salary system may drive executives' carries on the high risk investment. Large amount of assets were directly shifted to the executives by great salaries scale, while the executives could not protect the shareholder's benefit after obtaining the salary instead of protect their own benefit in the crisis. Therefore, agent relations have not been improved. All in all, the key points of executives' compensation system should be: establishing perfect pay supervision system and suitable executives' performance evaluation system. At the same time, the short-term and long-term interests should be taken to proper attention.
机译:美国次贷危机启动了全球金融危机,导致全球经济遭受严重攻击。五个美国着名投资银行陷入危机。在五项投资银行的相关问题的基础上,包括高盛兄弟赔偿数据,本文给出了定量分析,发现了高盛兄弟的薪酬体系缺陷,表明了不合理的薪酬体系投掷了线路脱离业务的重要原因。过度短期驱动的薪资系统可能会推动高管执行高风险投资。大量资产通过薪水规模直接转移到高管,而高管在获得薪资后不能保护股东的利益,而不是保护自己在危机中的利益。因此,代理关系尚未得到改善。总而言之,高管薪酬制度的关键要点应该是:建立完善的薪酬监督系统和合适的高管绩效评估系统。与此同时,应采取短期和长期利益来适当关注。

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