CEO Turnover, Corporate Governance and Investor Protection:Evidence from the Listed Companies in Post-SSR Era of China

摘要

CEO turnover is an important mechanism of corporate governance, which involves in the efficiency of investors protection. Using the post split-share structure of China as the background, this paper researches the causes of CEO turnover and the performance effect and value effect of the turnover from the perspective of performance. The empirical study result shows that loss and decline of accounting income will cause CEO turnover significantly, the probability of CEO turnover for firms with profit has higher sensitivity while its performance decline than that of those loss firm. At the same time, the author finds CEO turn has stronger value effect, which can increase the firms' market value significantly, but not for accounting performance. For the loss firms, both the value effect and performance effect are all evident, and far greater than those of profit firms. The results of this paper have reference and implication significance for improving CEO governance and investors' protection.