Current approaches to the security-oriented classification of process log traces can be split into two categories: (i) example-driven methods, that induce a classifier from annotated example traces; (ii) model-driven methods, based on checking the conformance of each test trace to security-breach models defined by experts. These categories are orthogonal and use separate information sources (i.e. annotated traces and a-priori breach models). However, as these sources often coexist in real applications, both kinds of methods could be exploited synergistically. Unfortunately, when the log traces consist of (low-level) events with no reference to the activities of the breach models, combining (i) and (ii) is not straightforward. In this setting, to complement the partial views of insecure process-execution patterns that an example-driven and a model-driven methods capture separately, we devise an abstract classification framework where the predictions provided by these methods separately are combined, according to a meta-classification scheme, into an overall one that benefits from all the background information available. The reasonability of this solution is backed by experiments performed on a case study, showing that the accuracy of the example-driven (resp., model-driven) classifier decreases appreciably when the given example data (resp., breach models) do not describe exhaustively insecure process behaviors.
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