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Implicit and Explicit Certificates-Based Encryption Scheme

机译:基于隐式和显式的基于证书的加密方案

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Certificate-based encryption (CBE) combines traditional public-key encryption and certificateless encryption. However, it does suffer to the Denial of Decryption (DoD) attack called by Liu and Au. To capture this attack, they introduced a new paradigm called self-generated-certificate public key cryptography. In this paper we show that the problem of DoD attack can be solved with a new implicit and explicit certificates-based public key cryptography paradigm. More importantly, we propose a concrete implicit and explicit certificate-based encryption (IE-CBE) scheme that defends against DoD attack. This new scheme is enhanced version of CBE scheme and preserves all its advantages, i.e., every user is given by the trusted authority an implicit certificate as a part of a private key and generates his own secret key and corresponding public key. In addition, in the IE-CBE scheme trusted authority has to generate an explicit certificate for a user with some identity and a public key. We prove that our scheme is IND-CCA2~- and DoD-Free secure in the random oracle model as hard is to solve p-BDHI and k-CCA problems.
机译:基于证书的加密(CBE)将传统的公钥加密和无证书加密结合起来。然而,它确实遭受了刘和Au调用的拒绝解密(DOD)攻击。要捕捉此攻击,他们介绍了一个名为自生成证书公钥加密的新范式。在本文中,我们表明,可以通过新的隐含和显式证书的公钥加密范例来解决DoD攻击问题。更重要的是,我们提出了一种混凝土隐含和明确的基于证书的加密(IE-CBE)计划,用于防止国防部攻击。这种新方案是CBE方案的增强版本,并保留所有其优点,即,每个用户都是由可信任权限给出的隐式证书作为私钥的一部分,并生成他自己的密钥和相应的公钥。此外,在IE-CBE方案中,可信任权限必须为具有某些身份和公钥的用户生成明确的证书。我们证明我们的计划是Ind-CCA2〜 - 并且在随机的Oracle模型中没有难以解决P-BDHI和K-CCA问题。

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