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Probabilistic Action and Deontic Logic

机译:概率动作和语言逻辑

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Deontic logic aims at formally modeling the reasoning with norm-related modalities. Von Wright recognized that the obligation modality bears a resemblance to modal necessity and the permission modality to modal possibility, which resulted in his Standard Deontic Logic [9]. SDL is the modal logic KD. Since its conception, SDL has drawn a lot of criticism: e.g., Chisholm [2] argued that it was unfit to represent certain types of conditional obligation, and Makinson [5] and van der Torre [6] emphasized that deontic logic is much more naturally studied as a process of iterative detachment relative to explicitly represented normative systems; a view that does not fit well with the modal logic modeling proposed by Von Wright. One way in which SDL, but also most other systems of deontic logic, falls short is the treatment of action with uncertain, probabilistic or attempted effects. Yet it is very natural, and sometimes even crucial for rational decision making, to reason, for instance, about being forbidden to take certain risks, being obliged to try something, or to avoid being liable for an attempted crime (see [10] for an excellent philosophical discussion of the role of attempt in criminal law). In our view, the modalities involved in these cases can all be viewed as applying to probabilistic action, that is, action with a certain chance of success. In particular, we suggest to model attempts as actions maximizing subjective probabilities of action success [1]. This modeling of attempt is quite different from other approaches in the literature. Placek [7] aims to define attempt entirely in terms of objective, non-mental modalities. Vanderveken [8] does take a subjective stance, but does not use probabilities or any other means to represent subjective epistemic attitudes. Finally, Herzig and Lorini [4] see attempt as an internal mental action preceding the objective external action. The first question we will discuss is how the obligation to attempt an action can be suitably modeled in a probabilistic stit framework extended with deontic modalities.
机译:道义逻辑旨在正式建模规范相关的方式的原因。冯赖特认识到,义务模态具有相似对模态必要性和许可模式到模式的可能性,这导致他标准道义逻辑[9]。 SDL是模态逻辑KD。由于它的概念,SDL已经引起了很多批评:例如,奇泽姆[2]认为,这是不适宜表示某些类型的条件的义务,并且马金森[5]和van der托瑞[6]强调义务逻辑是更自然研究作为相对于显式地表示规范体系迭代分离的处理;不与模态逻辑合身一个视点建模提出冯赖特。在SDL,也是道义逻辑的多数其他系统,短期下降的方法之一是不确定的,概率或试图影响作用的治疗。然而,这是很自然的,有时甚至是理性决策的关键,理性,比如,关于被禁止冒一定的风险,而不得不尝试一些东西,或避免被一个犯罪未遂责任(见[10]尝试在刑法中的作用的一个很好的哲学讨论)。我们认为,涉案的方式都可以被看作是适用于概率行动,也就是行动的成功一定的偶然性。特别是,我们的建议行动最大化行动的成功[1]的主观概率模型的尝试。尝试这种造型是从其他文献的方法完全不同。普拉赛克[7]旨在完全在目标的,非心理模式来定义的尝试。 Vanderveken [8]确实需要一种主观的姿态,但不使用概率或任何其他方式来表示主观认知的态度。最后,Herzig的和Lorini [4]看到试图作为目标外部动作之前的内部心理作用。我们将讨论的第一个问题是如何尝试动作的义务可以在概率stit框架扩展与道义方式进行适当建模。

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