Partially Observable Stochastic Games for Cyber Deception Against Network Epidemic

摘要

A Decentralized Denial of Service is an attack done by an agent capable to control the spread of a malware. This is a combination of epidemiological and conflictual aspects between several decision makers. There exists in the literature papers that study (non oriented) epidemics and papers that study network attacks regardless the epidemiological aspect. We put together the two aspects and provide a new game theoretical model which is part of the family of partially observable stochastic games (POSG) but with particular features. We prove the consistency of heuristic search value iteration (HSVI) based algorithms. Our framework is applied to optimally design a cyber deception technique based on honeypots in order to control an epidemic cyber-attack of a network by a strategic attacker. Some basic simulations are proposed to illustrate the framework described in this work-in-progress paper.